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Abstract 
 
 This thesis seeks to understand motivations for collective violence beyond the 
traditional explanations of ethnic hatred or racism. Often, historical scholarship focuses 
on ethnic hatred and racism, and elaborates on the processes by which those notions and 
hatreds came to be. Scholarship in the political science realm often gets past the hatred 
hypothesis but does not explore historical myths and legacy formation as they contribute 
to past and current violence. This thesis employs a case study approach to understand 
collective violence that is global and takes multiple cultures and religions into account. 
The case studies were chosen thematically, and each case study had personal relevance, 
and elucidated concerns of ethical remembrance and memorialization particularly well. It 
employs the power/threat and political elite framework as the primary motivator of 
collective violence and seeks to explore the historical myths that led to past violence and 
how the legacies of those events are causing current conflict. 
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Introduction 
 
“Be prepared... the past is coming.” 
“Words from a Young Night” by Qassim Haddad 
An Explanation of Collective Violence 
 
 Collective violence can be broadly defined. It is usually described as violence by 
people who identify themselves as members of a group against those of another to 
achieve political, economic, or social objectives. As such, the definition of “group” 
begins to play a large role in what we define as “collective.” For the purposes of this 
analysis, collective violence is largely defined as most group versus group dynamics, 
including mob violence and riots, as well as violence by an individual acting on behalf of 
a larger group, often framed in ideological terms. This thesis will explore the dominant 
pre-existing frameworks that are used to explain collective violence, and case studies to 
determine how effective those frameworks are. It will also explore historical memory, 
and legacy formation as a result of violence and dominant themes and factors that exist 
across different cases of collective violence. 
 This analysis is primarily based on incidences of violence that would be described 
as ethnic or racial violence. While the case studies at play are indeed motivated by ethnic 
and racial hatred, this thesis explores alternative explanations for these events. This 
thesis, rather than arguing that ethnic and racial violence are not significant motivators 
for violence, stems instead from an exploration of the limitations of ethnic/racial hatred 
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models, and their treatment of the “collective.”1 These models often take a bird’s eye 
view, allowing the causes for political differences to seem like inevitabilities that stem 
from hatred. Ethnic violence is never easy to comprehend, especially when the 
perpetrators are civilians and their victims are their neighbors, friends, and community 
members. It is this “intimate” violence that this thesis seeks to make thinkable, while 
avoiding a default assumption that simplistic notions of hatred motivate collective action. 
Ethnic/racial violence exists in many communities, but pogroms, massacres and 
genocides occur in a minority of communities. This thesis highlights and explores 
specific moments of collective violence as they relate to larger movements that then 
create problematic legacies.  
 The four localities discussed in this analysis, Tulsa, Poland, the Indian 
subcontinent, and Rwanda, were all surrounded by communities with similar group 
dynamics, and yet violence only broke out in a limited geographic subset. And so, 
ethnicity and race can only be one factor amongst many, rather than the primary factor. 
Not only is accepting ethnicity and race as primary motivators worrying in that it allows 
us to overlook other factors, but it also plays into problematic tropes that political leaders 
push as an attempt to veil their failings or mask other political problems as racial and 
ethnic divisions. In fact, allowing ethnic or racial divides to serve as the primary 
motivation and explanation for violence means that many commentators become 
complicit in political projects of governing elites. Another important lens to apply to 
questions of collective violence is to view it as a process rather than a moment. This not 
only means that it is key to place it in a larger historical context to examine the complex 
 
1 Ben Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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dynamics at play, but also to allow actors to move between or occupy multiple categories 
at the same time. Viewing actors in a dynamic way allows us to better understand their 
role in contexts of violence.2 Actors often move between “perpetrator” and “bystander,” 
or “rescuer” and “victim.” Furthermore, actors cannot be easily put into one box or the 
other in regard to ethnicity, because this erases the role of elites or the state in generating 
these identities to serve a political end. While that end may not be intentional violence, it 
could be an attempt to draw convenient lines to carry out state projects, which might 
eventually result in violence.  
 At its core, this analysis seeks to provide a framework by which to consider 
intimate collective violence. Collective violence is difficult to understand for many 
reasons, including but not limited to the fact that it is difficult to grapple with the idea of 
people killing those close to them. Violence often confounds rational explanations. 
Civilians do better in times of peace than they do in times of war and so, it does not make 
sense for civilians to go along with elite projects, given that civilians stand to gain the 
least with the most risk, and elites stand to gain the most with the least risk. Intimate 
violence makes it even more difficult to consider given that strong kinship ties should 
preclude violence, especially genocide, not facilitate it.  
The Rationale Behind the Case Studies 
 
 The first case study explores the Tulsa Race Massacre as an example of racial 
violence. The chapter introduces how national tropes, such as the myth of the American 
 
2 Lee Ann Fuji, Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Cornell University Press, 2009), 
11. 
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Dream, come to play a dominant role in motivating violence and assesses the theory of 
power/threat as a means to analyze this historical moment. This chapter will first examine 
the riots, and how they began, and Tulsa’s cultural context. The Tulsan context is key 
because black people in Tulsa lived with relative freedom and social mobility, especially 
as compared to the rest of the South. Black Tulsans not only did relatively well 
financially, hence the existence of a “Black Wall Street,” but also were somewhat 
politically engaged, and spoke out against the racist injustices of the time, like lynching. 
Greenwood, the predominantly black neighborhood in Tulsa, was a largely self-sufficient 
community and did not have to rely culturally or economically on Tulsa’s white 
residents—it had schools, a theater, a library, hospitals, and a thriving commercial street. 
In many ways, this community, which contained people who were former slaves, was 
well on its way to achieving the American Dream. The chapter explores how even if a 
marginalized community is able to overcome the systemic barriers against it to attain the 
American Dream, it can be forcibly and violently stripped of the ability to attain it 
because the realization of prosperity becomes a threat to the racial hegemony.  
 The chapter will chronologically follow the legacy of the Tulsa Race Riots, first 
examining how the black and white community constructed different memories of the 
events in the immediate aftermath of the violence, and then following the riot’s legacy 
through history through multiple primary sources before exploring the present 
conversation around reparations and the Tulsa Race Riot’s new resurgence in our 
collective memory embodied in the new HBO show The Watchmen. The chapter thus 
presents one method for analyzing collective violence through the power/threat theory, 
which is the idea that the dominant population will strike out against a minority 
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population if they are perceived to be amassing too much 
(political/cultural/social/economic) capital. Even if the threat is not absolute, due to the 
huge disparity in capital, many majority groups often lash out when capital is perceived 
to be amassed too quickly or “catches up” to the status of the hegemonic group. 
Interestingly, this often takes the form of social or cultural capital, rather than political or 
economic, adding strength to the theory that it might have more to do with group pride 
than group power.  
The second case study in this thesis explores anti-Jewish pogroms during World 
War II as a form of ethnic violence. The theories and questions explored in this chapter 
relate to the creation of political hegemony and the consequences of competing national 
projects. The pogroms occurred in primarily Polish and Ukrainian communities, often 
with very little pressure or involvement from the Nazi forces. Fewer than 10% of these 
communities experienced violence, leading scholars to wonder what set apart the 
communities that did. This case study largely supports the findings of the previous one, 
showing that violence typically stemmed from a desire to maintain Polish and Ukrainian 
dominance, rather than anti-Semitic hatred. This case study is valuable because it 
compares well with the Tulsa Race Massacre since it contains a similar power/threat 
framework, but this threat was political and national rather than cultural and economic. 
The pre-existing narrative focuses on the myths of Jewish culpability grounded in 
theology and Nazi facilitation. This approach, while clear cut, fails to acknowledge that 
anti-Semitism persisted throughout Germany and Eastern Europe, but civilian led 
massacres occurred in a minority of localities. Furthermore, pinning the blame squarely 
6 
 
on the Nazis ignores civilian culpability and the aspect of popular violence (violence with 
mass participation.  
When we assume that the Nazis forced the civilians to involve themselves, we not 
only remove civilians from the category of perpetrators and ignore their role as complicit 
witnesses, but we also ignore the pernicious factors at play that persuaded citizens to take 
up arms against their Jewish neighbors. Nazis were often present but did not act as a 
central force. The collapse of local order also meant that pogroms were conducted in 
times of statelessness and so political elites could not be blamed. The violence was also 
intimate, unlike the sanitized machine of the Holocaust. The violence was carried out 
with clubs and shovels, and Jews were paraded through the town. The violent event was 
often based on humiliating rituals and seemed intensely personal. Most scholarship on the 
violence of the period focuses on Nazi involvement, economic rivalry, and the anti-
Semitic revenge theory. This chapter’s approach is to explore how pogroms were instead 
a means by which to get rid of Jews because Jews were seen as future political rivals—
the deciding factor was the popularity of parties that pushed minority rights. In localities 
in which Ukrainian and Polish political parties advocating for minority rights for Jews 
were popular, pogroms were more likely to occur. 
The next chapter explores violence as a result of nation-building and nationalism 
and focuses on violence stemming from the 1947 Partition of British India. This chapter 
will explore how political elites, specifically Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Mahatma Gandhi 
and Jawarlal Nehru, were able to use religious rhetoric to construct national identities for 
Hindus and Muslims, and then created polarizing and explosive situations wherein 
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violence was likely to break out to achieve their personal and political aims. The chapter 
also explores how other elites within the All India Muslim League and the National 
Congress stoked religious hatreds and spread propaganda that enabled the massacres to 
become a wave of violence rather than random and localized bursts. Thus, while much of 
the sentiment and violence was grounded in religious sentiment, the chapter will argue 
that it would not have occurred with the intensity that it did without the threat of 
independence and political inconsequentiality looming on the horizon. The chapter 
focuses on the figure of Jinnah because Jinnah originally refused to deploy religious 
rhetoric and felt that doing so was a dangerous strategy, but then decided to adopt it as a 
means to emerge as the sole spokesman of India’s Muslims.  
The Rwandan Genocide serves as a valuable case study because of the distinct 
role that the Rwandan government played in its attempt to reconcile the two populations 
to avoid immediate bloodshed.  It embarked on a path to transitional justice and 
education and thus represents the only case study in which there was an urgent need, and 
therefore a strategy, to reconcile the two warring populations. This means that the 
Rwandan Genocide, while certainly still with hidden motivations, does not seek to 
villainize and polarize the population but rather acknowledges the plights of the victims 
and perpetrators. The Rwandan Genocide was both intimate and popular, and emerged 
largely out of the racialization of the Hutu/Tutsi difference by Belgian colonial ruling 
strategies. The themes and theories explored in this chapter are the alien/native 
dynamic—how Hutus were disenfranchised and considered to be less civilized, while the 
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Tutsi were uplifted as superior, based on the Hamitic hypothesis3. This created a dynamic 
wherein the Tutsi were seen as a privileged minority with access to power, parallel to 
colonizers, which eventually led to them being constructed as an alien population within 
the emergent nation-state. This chapter makes the point that ethnic divides can result in 
massacres and pogroms, but a racial difference is required for genocide, and so it 
examines how an ethnic difference was racialized to the point that almost everyone in 
Rwanda became either a victim or a perpetrator. Further, it explores the significance of 
historical memory and legacies of violence by analyzing the victim/perpetrator cycle 
from the 1959 Revolution, to the later civil war and Rwandan Patriotic Front invasion 
and eventually the genocide.4  
Partition violence was not as intimate as the first case studies because the targets 
were often refugee caravans and trains, but there was certainly popular participation. 
Political elites used historical and theological myths to mold a national identity for 
Hindus and Muslims and to exacerbate the Muslim threat to the Sikhs. Gandhi himself 
had employed this strategy from the earlier part of the twentieth century, and Jinnah had 
derided it as dangerously sectarian. After a humiliating defeat in the 1937 elections, it 
became clear to Jinnah that he had to employ any tools necessary to regain political 
capital. The distrust that existed between Jinnah and Nehru before Partition only 
increased afterward, and that legacy festered on after the death of these key figures. 
Pakistan and India are currently grappling with very similar conflicts and will continue to 
 
3 Supposes that any progress and development among agricultural blacks was the result of 
conquest or infiltration by pastoralists from northern or northeastern Africa, allegedly a branch of 
the Caucasian race. 
4 The Rwandan Patriotic Front is the current ruling political party in Rwanda. Its armed wing, led 
by current president Paul Kagame, ended the Rwandan genocide in 1994.  
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be plagued by these divisions unless there is an intentional strategy in place to break the 
cycle and tell an honest history. Like the Partition, each of the case studies explored in 
this thesis continue to unfold in the present and demonstrate the importance of legacies 
and how we write history. In the case of the Tulsa Race Massacre, the current relevance 
is reparations, and for anti-Jewish pogroms, it is the political upheaval in Poland. In both 
these situations, responsible memorialization and legacy formation would lead to better 
political situations that might mitigate the violence that the target communities face. 
However, for the legacy of Partition, the effects are very direct. There are still consistent 
Muslim massacres in India and skirmishes over Kashmir, and the rhetoric causing these 
can be directly traced to the legacy of Partition. Reparations and memorialization would 
right some past wrongs and create a moment of education, but it is not clear that it would 
fully prevent violence against black Americans. With Poland, proper memorialization and 
remembrance would likely prevent denialism and anti-Semitic narratives that allows 
nationalist parties to gain a hold, and so would result in better civic and political 
conditions for the Polish Jews, but it’s not necessarily true that it would prevent civilian 
violence or hate crimes. With Pakistan/India and the next case study, the Rwanda 
genocide, responsible legacy creation could prevent civilians from taking up their arms 
against each other.  
Historical Memory and Legacy Formation 
 
 This project is concerned with the ethics of history as a discipline and the 
consequences of reproducing narratives without critically examining the notions they 
perpetuate. These historiographic narratives do not reproduce neutrality, but often 
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reproduce an indifference that silences the most marginalized voices in the story. The 
historical subjects of violence are vulnerable to power dynamics that are then reproduced 
through irresponsible stewardship of their stories. It is not only important to resist 
reproducing such irresponsible narratives to avoid these actors’ further subjugation within 
historical paradigms, but also to avoid the potential use of such narratives to continue to 
subjugate already precarious populations. The preservation of historical memory that 
validates the diversity of collective violence is crucial since people build the present and 
the future on the basis of the past, and so the past cannot be written in such a way that it 
fulfills the original intent of violent acts. The past is often used as a moral lesson by 
hegemonic groups to justify their actions or agenda. Historical analysis can intervene in 
this discourse and the abuse of history as a means to retain power. Historical memory 
also serves as a basis for hope and can act as a reconciliatory or uniting force. If legacies 
can be used to resolve disputes and solve problems, since they act as common stories and 
lessons, we may begin to use them to prevent or undo damage done.  
 History can be used as a self-affirming force in most cases, as individuals and 
groups are able to find their own histories to cling to. Memory is subject to manipulation, 
and so groups with ulterior motives will always be able to construct a version of events 
that can incentivize a population to create conflict. Since the Holocaust, the theme of 
“never forget” has been dominant but has not effectively guarded the world against 
collective violence or genocidal tendencies. Even the Holocaust was justified on the basis 
of historical myths of anti-Semitic legends. The Holocaust further proves the point that 
most ideological groups have long held the belief that “they are destined in the long run 
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to triumph over the infidels,”5 and groups in power are able to construct the “infidel” as 
whomever they so choose. This makes it clear that the admonition to “never forget,” is 
not enough, and rather, there must be an active attempt to preserve the past in a way that 
does not diminish the true victims or incite further violence.  
 As memory passes from generation to generation, it changes. This is in part due to 
the fragility of memory and in part due to elites manipulating history for their ends. This 
process of passing on memories results in individual, group, and national identity 
formation, and serves as a context from which people may choose to take further political 
actions. As explained earlier, the process of establishing group identities is important 
because how we define groups not only changes how one understands collective 
violence, but how one creates it. In these case studies, it becomes clear that historical 
myths (theological and sociological) and historical processes (accruing capital and status) 
serve a dual purpose: the construction of group identities and the creation of the right 
environment for violence.  
  
 
5 Stuart Hampshire. Innocence and Experience (Harvard University Press, 1989), 136. 
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Violence as a Result of Economic Threat: The Tulsa Race Massacres 
 
“The things that abandon you get remembered different. 
As precise as the English language can be, with words 
Like penultimate and perseverate, there is not a combination 
of sounds that describe only that leaving.” 
“Blood History” by Dwayne Betts 
The Myth of the American Dream and Power Threat Theory 
 
 The 1921 Tulsa Race Riots’ events were contested and controversial, even in 
academia, until very recently. Even now, after the 1921 Tulsa Race Riot Commission 
published A Report by the Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 in 
2001, no one knows exactly how many people died.6 The report could on corroborate the 
bare bones story of events that as fact. The neighborhood of Greenwood, Tulsa was a 
prosperous and thriving black community, especially by the standards of the time. The 
community was doing well across the board: politically, culturally, socially, and 
economically. “Black Wall Street” was a space that was unlike any other in the United 
States at the time, until it was burned to the ground. The Tulsa Race Riots was one of the 
nation’s darkest and bloodiest acts of violence, and one of the most defining acts of racial 
violence. The economic and social capital of Greenwood caused a violent backlash from 
white Tulsans, and the subsequent silence surrounding the riots served the same end of 
oppressing an already marginalized group. The legacy of the Tulsa Race Riots illustrates 
the importance of historical memories in reconciliation and rebuilding. 
 
6 Oklahoma Commission to Study the Race Riot of 1921, Tulsa Race Riot, (2001). 
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The riots’ erasure from our historical memory brings up important questions 
about the formation of historical and collective memory and the way enduring legacies of 
momentous events are shaped. Moreover, the intentional nature of the riots’ violence 
illuminates the hypocrisy of the American Dream myth. Some of the events of the Tulsa 
Race Riots can be agreed upon. The black community did believe that Dick Rowland 
would be lynched, and they knew that the reasons for his arrest were highly suspicious. 
Dick Rowland was a 19 year old shoe-shiner who was accused of assaulting a 17 year old 
white girl names Sarah Page. The black community also felt a pressure to act, believing 
that his safety was in their hands. At the gathering of several hostile groups, tensions 
worsened, and government forces did not take effective action to calm the situation. Once 
violence erupted, civil officials chose to deputize some men. All these men were white 
and some of them were participants in the violence. None of them caused the violence to 
erupt, but many took actions that were illegal and potentially amplified the situation. 
Public officials provided firearms and ammunition to civilians, all of them white men. 
Units of Oklahoma’s National Guard mass arrested almost all of Greenwood’s residents 
and detained them in mass holding centers or in other parts of the city. People, some of 
them government officials, entered Greenwood and began to steal property left inside 
homes and businesses. They then burned or destroyed over a thousand homes and 
structures such as churches, schools, businesses, a hospital, and a library. No government 
official at any level intervened. Credible estimates, such as those of the American Red 
Cross, estimate that between one and three hundred people were killed.7  None of these 
 
7 Maurice Williams, “Disaster Relief Report,” American Red Cross, 3. 
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acts have ever been prosecuted and rebuilding efforts were left to the victims of the 
destruction.  
 The aforementioned series of events represents a barebones outline of the 
violence that was carried out by one side of Tulsa on another, but there is an important 
context to explore.8 Greenwood, or “Little Africa,” was a largely self-sufficient 
community. The black people of Greenwood lived in relative freedom, with their own 
hospital, school, theater, shops, and newspapers. Oklahoma was not plagued by the 
traditions and racism of the Old South, and the black community often spoke out against 
lynching and were advocates for equality. They believed that schools could be separate, 
but they should be of the same quality—blacks, segregated, should receive the same 
treatment as whites. These ideas were distributed in black newspapers, and often made 
their way to courts.9 After World War I, there was even more talk of equal rights. Black 
men had served in the military, risked their lives for their country, watched President 
Wilson talk about the need for freedom and the horror of pogroms. The community was 
vibrant and thriving.10 Economically, Greenwood’s businesses were a commercial 
success. The area’s affluence and entrepreneurial spirit led many to call it “Black Wall 
Street.” And Tulsa’s booming economy was, in part, dependent on this financial success 
since black patrons had nowhere else to take their business. Limited by segregation, black 
residents could not frequent downtown white-owned businesses. Intellectually, 
politically, and religiously, Tulsa also stood apart. There were two newspapers, a library, 
 
8 Oklahoma Commission to Study the Race Riot of 1921, Tulsa Race Riot, (2001). 10. 
9 Alfred Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland: The Tulsa Riot of 1921: Race, Reparations, and 
Reconciliation, (Oxford University Press, 2002). 6. 
10Oklahoma Commission, Tulsa Race Riot, 4. 
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all black Democrat and Republican clubs, and high church membership. By most 
accounts, the residents of Greenwood, many slaves just sixty years prior, were on their 
way to achieving the American Dream. This suggestion is not to imply that most 
Greenwood residents were wealthy, but many were homeowners and seemed to have a 
shot at class mobility.11 
 The Tulsa Race Riots may have been set off by the prospect of Dick Rowland’s 
lynching, but the violence was no less motivated by an outrage at the economic ambitions 
of black Tulsan’s and a fury at the audacity of black World War I veterans to demand 
equality. A framework that is helpful to analyze the events of Tulsa in 1921 is Hubert 
Blalock’s power threat theory.12 Blalock asserts that when a dominant group perceives an 
economic or political threat from a minority group, the dominant group will take action to 
maintain their hegemony. This theory has often been applied to situations of collective 
violence to explain why one group would turn on another, even though they inhabit the 
same communal and physical space. Greenwood’s wealth and prosperity created a violent 
backlash intended to weaken the economic, and therefore political and social, power of 
the black community in Tulsa. 
 Any chance of black Tulsans achieving the American Dream was intentionally 
destroyed by the rioters. While social mobility in the way that white Tulsans experienced 
it was probably never on the table for black Tulsans, they had been getting dangerously 
close. There was a powerful upper class developing, and many had the means to amass 
wealth. The swift and sudden destruction of Greenwood shows us how the American 
 
11 Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland, 8. 
12 Hubert Blalock, Toward a theory of minority-group relations, (New York: Wiley, 1967). 
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Dream has often played out historically for black communities. Even when they can 
prosper, with the institutional and structural inequalities and injustices that they are faced 
with, their wealth will be wiped out. The rioters were ruthlessly efficient in terms of 
effectively wiping out all sources of wealth from the community, but there was also a 
larger symbolic aim to be achieved: keeping a race in its place. There were individual 
crimes committed against individual people, but intentional enough that these acts did not 
serve as individual but rather as a collective trauma. Like a lynching, the Tulsa Race 
Riots served not to “punish with death, but to terrify the living.”13 There was a message 
to be sent. Ambitiousness and assertiveness were not tolerated from black Tulsans. 
 In the weeks following the riots, reactions revolved around the assignment of 
blame. When the riot initially happened, it was front page news across America. The New 
York Times ran the headline, “85 WHITES AND NEGROES DIE IN TULSA RIOTS.”14 
Across the country, similar headlines appeared in newspapers.15 The Nation, often a 
supporter of black causes, ran the headline, “The Eruption of Tulsa,”16 by Walter White. 
This article is still considered to be one of the influential accounts of what happened, and 
it is worth noting what language was used.17   The white woman who accused Dick 
Rowland of assault is described as “hysterical.” The article goes on to discuss how black 
Tulsans were often regarded as radical, and how that designation is absurd considering it 
referenced their denunciation of Jim Crow era laws. Meanwhile in the Survey, Amy 
Comstock wrote “Another View of the Tulsa Riots,” an article deflecting blame from 
 
13 Oklahoma Commission, Tulsa Race Riot, 17. 
14 “85 WHITES AND NEGROES DIE IN TULSA RIOTS,” The New York Times, June 2, 1921. 
15 Oklahoma Commission, Tulsa Race Riot, 25. 
16 Walter White, “The Eruption of Tulsa,” The Nation, June 29, 1921. 
17Editors and Walter White, “Tulsa, 1921,” The Nation, August 20, 2001. 
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Tulsa’s white citizenry and instead onto Tulsa’s poor black community.18 She argued that 
it was the responsibility of white officials to fix the conditions that led to such poor 
infrastructure and law enforcement, conditions that made it difficult to have “good 
citizens.”19 She argues that Greenwood became a “crook’s paradise” but now Tulsa 
officials would rebuild it to be a more sanitary area. She regularly equates cleanliness 
with criminal activity, which is a common tool to avoid overtly equating cleanliness with 
black people (or other people of color). These two articles work somewhat as a summary 
of the black reaction versus the white reaction in Tulsa, but do not adequately convey the 
sense of remorse on behalf of the white community in Tulsa. In the immediate aftermath 
of the riots, there was remorse and a promise to rebuild. But the blame from white Tulsa 
was still on “bad negroes” and the criminals of Greenwood. In fact, Tulsa Mayor T.D. 
Evans was happy the destruction was limited to Greenwood: “I say it was good 
generalship to let the destruction come to the where the trouble was hatched up, put in 
motion, and where it had its inception.” 
The search for blame continued in the press. The New York Times published two 
articles on June 4th and June 5th (1921), first implying responsibility on the part of the 
African Blood Brotherhood, and then releasing a statement by the head of the 
organization denying it. The Blood Brotherhood say that they believe in black people’s 
right to self-defense, but did not intentionally incite the riot.20 The Chicago Tribune ran 
“POLICE AIDED TULSA RIOTERS,” a long piece summarizing the events leading to 
 
18 Amy Comstock, “Another View of the Tulsa Riots,” Survey, July 2, 1921. 
19Comstock, “Another View of the Tulsa Riots.” 
20 “Denies Negroes Started Tulsa Riots,” The New York Times, June 5, 1921.  
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the riot, and focusing on how the police intentionally gave “armed white ruffians” guns to 
help them murder black Tulsans.21 Within Tulsa, the conversation had taken on a peculiar 
tone. While there was an emphasis on rebuilding and restoring Greenwood and raising 
funds for victims, the discourse about “bad black” men was thriving. There was a sense 
that the riot had originated from black Tulsans’ decision to take the law into their own 
hands. The idea was that they should have trusted the law to protect Dick Rowland. Most 
articles agree that there was significant white criminal behavior in the riots but frame the 
criminality as a reaction to black provocation. The conversation for white interpreters 
was often framed by the purported arrogance of Greenwood residents and discussed how 
their ideas of racial equality were inflammatory and led to the agitation that eventually 
provoked the riot.22   
The white interpretation of the riot is key to understanding why the riots began. In 
a white paper, appearing a few days after the riots, the article emphasized kindness where 
there was hatred: “The white citizens of Tulsa have forgotten the bitter hatred and their 
desperation that caused them to meet the negroes in battle to the death Tuesday night and 
are now thinking of them only as helpless refugees.”23 If the white Tulsans were trying to 
put Greenwood residents in their place through the riot, seeing them as victims afterwards 
supported this aim. Greenwood residents as helpless victims and refugees perpetuates the 
narrative that they are no longer a threat to white authority. Now, they are subject to 
 
21 “Police Aided Tulsa Rioters,” The Chicago Defender, June 11, 1921. 
22 Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland, 71. 
23 Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland, 73. 
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white pity and reliant on white charity for help. Their kindness is not to suggest that 
white Tulsans viewed black Tulsans in a positive light. Black Tulsans were still seen as 
criminals, childlike, arrogant and lazy. The white hegemony and social control remained 
intact and was not threatened by white kindness to black Tulsans but upheld by it.  
These views were made official in the Grand Jury report. The report considered 
predominantly white accounts of the riots and chose evidence so selectively that it was 
essentially a retelling of the white side of the story. The report blamed social agitation 
amongst the blacks and a breakdown of law enforcement.24 Key to blaming the riots on 
the black Tulsans was the denial of the lynching threat. If the threat of Dick Rowland 
lynching was nonexistent, the veteran’s initial actions are no longer defensible. 
Therefore, it is easy to frame the riots as black Tulsans inciting violence in a space in 
which there was none, and framing the white Tulsans as peaceful and innocent, swept up 
in the violence as it erupted. The report also focused on law enforcement and talked about 
how there was a breakdown of governance in Greenwood. To prevent more incidents like 
the riots, policing and enforcement should be stricter in Greenwood, and whites and 
blacks should not be allowed to mingle freely in dance halls. Black Tulsans also viewed 
the riots through the lens of a breakdown of the law, but they saw the law as having failed 
 
24 “Grand Jury Blames Negroes for Inciting Race Rioting; Whites Clearly Exonerated,” Tulsa 
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to protect Greenwood from violence.25 They viewed the riots as being part of a long 
pattern in which they were denied equal protection under the law.  
In the weeks and days following the riots, there was significant news attention. 
Most of the press was negative, many papers offered harsh condemnations of the events 
in Tulsa. The Christian Recorder 
called the incident a “shame upon 
America.”26 For Tulsan citizens, 
and especially for public or civil 
officials, this kind of attention was 
totally undesirable. Oklahoma and 
Tulsa were growing economic 
centers, desperate for people to 
move in and contribute to growth. People feared that this kind of negative press attention 
would turn away prospective residents and business owners. For Tulsa’s white business 
and political leaders, it was clear that this entire affair had to be swept under the rug. 
Historically, it is remarkable that the silence was created so effectively.  History 
textbooks published in the next two decades did not mention it, news stories began to 
disappear, and collective memory began to view this as an event that invoked shame 
rather than pride.27 In the decades immediately following the riots there wasn’t much 
acknowledgement of them. The Chicago Defender published a piece in July of 1922 
 
25 White, “The Eruption of Tulsa.”  
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Figure 1: The aftermath of Tulsa Race Massacre 
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called “Will Tulsa Riot Horrors Awaken America’s Indifferent Attitude,” but that seemed 
to be the end of the conversation for years.28  
The Legacy That Formed and Our Collective Memory 
 
Until very recently, the riots legacy has been one of silence. The Tulsa Race Riot 
report summarizes the reactions to and engagement with the events of the Tulsa Race 
Riots from its inception to the report’s publication. In short, there was very little activity 
until 1946. There were a few attempts by teachers and professors, such as Nancy 
Feldman, a sociology professor at the University of Tulsa in 1946, to engage with the 
material but they were met with little success until Loren Gill decided to make the riots 
the subject of his master’s thesis.29 A white World War II veteran, he was attending the 
University of Tulsa when his interest was caught by the lingering memories of the riots. 
His product, named “The Tulsa Race Riot,” was a result of impressive research skills and 
diligent investigative work.30 Despite his efforts, however, records about the riots 
remained buried and talk of the riots remained out of the public arena.  
Change began to be seen in the 1950s through the 1970s. As debates, nationally 
and in Tulsa, began about segregation and civil rights it was increasingly difficult to 
ignore Tulsa’s bloody and racist past. On June 1st, 1971, African American riot survivors 
gathered in Mount Zion Baptist Church to commemorate the riots. There were a few 
dozen survivors, and a few audience members, and it was the first public 
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acknowledgement of the riots in decades. In the same spring, there was another attempt at 
public acknowledgement. The publications manager at the Tulsa Chamber of Commerce 
decided that there should be an article published about the Tulsa Race Riots to 
commemorate its fiftieth anniversary. He hired Ed Wheeler, the host of ‘The Gilcrease 
Story,’ a popular history radio program, to research and write the article, and Wheeler 
agreed to do it. Wheeler dug up old records and spoke to dozens of riots survivors. 
Twice, he was threatened and told not to write the article. Both times he ignored the 
threats and forged ahead. The article, once written, was revolutionary and included never 
before published pictures, but the Chamber of Commerce killed the article. He had to 
publish it in Impact Magazine, a new and black oriented magazine, which limited the 
article’s audience from being citywide. There were similar efforts to bring the Tulsa Race 
Riots into the limelight through the 1970s. But all of them, like Wheeler’s article, were 
largely unsuccessful. But even if it were not in the spotlight, it was a little closer to the 
light, and laid the groundwork for efforts in the coming decades that would finally give 
the riots the attention they deserved.  
In the years before the Tulsa Race Riot report’s publication, there was a surge in 
interest in the riots. Leading up to the eightieth anniversary of the riots, stories about the 
riots appeared in most major publications and news stations. Less visible, but even more 
important, efforts were made to investigate and research the riots academically. Scholars 
began to comb through archives and conduct oral interviews to compile an accurate 
history of the riots so the incident might be more fully documented. The report itself was 
a tremendous undertaking and acted as a locator of a muddied truth. The Tulsa Race Riot 
report is an incredibly powerful document and wrote the history of an event that had been 
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intentionally forgotten and silenced. If the riots were undertaken by white Tulsans in 
order to relegate black Tulsans to a lower status, and history is written in a way that 
reflects the voices of white Tulsans, there is no way to make up for the injustices of the 
past. ‘Objective’ reports and documentation can often act as a means by which to silence 
histories depending on the agendas of the authors. If this report had simply written a 
history based off the sources easily available, it would have achieved the same effect. The 
intentional creation of historical memory, achieved with the Tulsa Race Riot report, was 
key in the path to reconciliation and rebuilding. 
While the Tulsa Race Riots re-emerged as part of a national collective memory  
after their eightieth anniversary, 2018 and 2019 saw a resurgence in the conversation 
surrounding the riots. In December 2017, 
the Tulsa 2021 project was announced.31 
This project, in turn, established the 1921 
Tulsa Race Riots Centennial Commission 
to “develop programs, projects, events and 
activities to commemorate and inform.”32 
Specifically, the commission’s aim is to 
work on fostering sustainable 
entrepreneurship and heritage tourism 
within the Greenwood District. In 
November 2018, the chair of the commission, Senator Kevin Matthews, announced that 
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the commission would change its name.33 He changed the name from the 1921 Tulsa 
Race Riots Centennial Commission to the 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre Centennial 
Commission. The designation of massacre, rather than riots, is important for a few 
reasons. Firstly, the name change caught on and academic circles have since begun to 
refer to the riots as a massacre instead. Secondly, it serves an important historical purpose 
in terms of accuracy. Massacre adequately conveys how one group had significantly 
more power than the other and killed members of that group along racial lines. Massacre 
conveys intentionality. Riots does not. Thirdly, the “riot” designation was the grounds 
upon which insurance companies turned away the claims of the black victims. The 
language used was significant in the obstacles to rebuilding and undermined avenues for 
legal action. The change of name is thus important as it works to acknowledge the 
injustice and constitutes a step towards reparations. 
Legal and journalistic acknowledgement is important but does not fully succeed 
in terms of putting the massacre in 
the public consciousness. In October 
2019, The  Watchmen premiered on 
HBO. The opening scene of the 
show depicts the Tulsa Race 
Massacre and suggested it could be a 
recurring plot point. In the show’s 
alternate timeline, reparations have been paid to victim’s families and bitterness about 
 
33 Randy Kriebel, “1921 centennial commission to replace 'riot' with 'massacre' in official title,” 
Tulsa World, November 27, 2018. 
Credit: HBO 
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this lingers amongst white supremacists.34 This led to a slew of articles that commented 
on HBO’s decision to focus on this event, and serve as a means to explain the “history” 
of the Tulsa Race Massacre. Articles appeared in The New York Times,35 The Washington 
Post,36 Vox,37 and The Atlantic,38 among others. A whole generation that had previously 
never heard of the riots was exposed to the controversy and the cultural commentary that 
The Watchmen and subsequent media provided. The first episode created a social media 
storm, with most viewers articulating that they had never heard of the Tulsa horrors.39 
The Watchmen brought the Tulsa Race Massacre back into our collective memory by 
linking it to popular culture. The show also restarted the conversation about reparations 
with the presentation of their alternate timeline. The lingering bitterness amongst white 
supremacists speaks to the omnipresent existence of anti-Black sentiment and violence 
and breaks the façade of a post-race society. The show serves as a commentary on how 
American society still grapples with racial violence and a racial hegemony because it 
never acknowledged the horrific violence of the past.  
Current Relevance: Reparations 
 
The Tulsa Race Massacre was one symptom of a pervasive and deeply rooted 
symptom of white supremacy in the US. This country is still grappling with the legacy of 
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redlining and racist housing laws. Police brutality terrorized black people right after 
slavery and still does. The net worth of the average white family is almost ten times 
greater than the average black family.40 Without acknowledging the real history of racial 
violence in this country, it is doomed to continue to exist in a racial system. There is an 
effective solution, and it would be to commission a group to study the question of 
reparations and assess possible solutions. This commission would be tasked with 
uncovering decades of anti-Black racism and would inevitably have to produce a report 
acknowledging it.41 
Tulsa dodged its responsibility to rebuild and to administer reparations. The city 
was tasked with establishing order, reuniting loved ones, and providing food, shelter, and 
clothing for the affected families. However, beyond initial promises to rebuild fueled by 
remorse, the city quickly sidestepped their responsibilities. The conversation was quickly 
reframed to focus on rebuilding Greenwood geographically far away from white Tulsa 
and making sure it was “cleaner” and better policed in its second iteration. The Oklahoma 
legal and political system, as usual, left black citizens without hope of justice. The 
reparations debate concerning the Tulsa Race Massacre exists at both a local and a 
national level, with academic and policy makers working together to come to a 
constructive conclusion. However, it is important to acknowledge the role that the shape 
of historical legacies play in the path to reconciliation. Financial reparations are only one 
of the ways in which injustice must be grappled with to facilitate healing. The role of 
memorialization and documentation is also crucial for reconciliation and redress, and for 
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the national conversation about race in the US. Without honestly grappling with the past, 
it is nearly impossible to pursue a meaningful and purposeful conversation about racism. 
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Violence as a Result of Political Threat: Anti-Jewish Pogroms 
 
“While helicopters bomb the streets, whatever they will open, will open. 
What is silence? Something of the sky in us.” 
“Deaf Republic” by Ilya Kaminsky 
Political Hegemony and Threat 
 
In the aftermath of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, there were 
waves of massacres of Jewish people throughout Ukrainian and Polish localities. This 
level of brutality is not particularly surprising, given that it paralleled the Nazi regime’s 
systematic extermination of the Jewish people in Germany and Poland. Not all cases of 
anti-Semitic violence were pogroms—the key feature of a pogrom is that it was civilian 
led. These massacres were not carried out by the Nazi establishment but rather by 
civilians and did not break out in most localities despite general anti-Semitic sentiment. 
This civilian led violence requires explanation since these instances of collective violence 
generally occurred in small localities in which people had known each other for several 
years, if not decades. The fact that there was a collapse of local order also means that the 
violence cannot be blamed on political elites, who often play a significant role in 
situations of ethnic violence.  
The Nazis were often present during pogroms but did not act as a central authority 
and their efforts to incite pogroms often failed. The pervasive presence of German army 
units, police battalions, and mobile killings has clear historical evidence. However, it 
seems that while Nazis might have desired more generalized anti-Semitic violence, they 
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did not force it.42 In the case of anti-Jewish pogroms, violence was situational rather than 
inherent. Their situationality means that we can compare localities to discover specific 
causes for these instances of collective violence that occurred along ethnic lines but were 
not exclusively motivated by ethnic hatred. 
Anti-Jewish sentiment and anti-Semitic hatred are leading theories to explain 
pogroms given that there is a long history of brutality and victimization of Jews in 
Eastern Europe (and elsewhere). These were not the first pogroms to occur. There was 
considerable evidence of anti-Semitic sentiment in preceding periods, and there had been 
repeated pogroms in many localities even just within the early part of the twentieth 
century. Further, Jews faced violence and discrimination (officially and unofficially) in 
their economic and social lives as well. Jews were subjected to a range of prejudices and 
stereotypes by non-Jews. There is anecdotal evidence that non-Jews viewed Jews with 
hostility and as an alien element. A lot of the anti-Jewish sentiment was construed in 
religious terms, for example labeling Jews as Christ-killers, which then evolved into the 
modern stereotypes that persisted, for example, in the form of labels such as swindlers or 
communists. While anti-Semitic sentiment had strong roots in Poland going back 
thousands of years, if anti-Semitic hatred was the primary driving force behind pogroms, 
we would see far more pogroms than we do. Anti-Semitic sentiment tells a very 
important aspect of the story, but it is nevertheless only one aspect. Politically, Jews were 
consistently put in a position to have to defend the few minority rights that they 
possessed amidst various restrictive laws. 
 
42 Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, Intimate Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms on the Eve of 
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Pogroms typically followed a routine of ritual humiliation. The humiliation 
generally centered around perceived Jewish religious norms, or perceived support for the 
Soviet occupation.43 Another defining characteristic of the violence was that it was not 
sterile—the violence was intimate. Perpetrator could not kill scores of people from far 
away- the violence was conducted in communal spaces and carried out by murderers who 
knew the Jews that they were beating to death. The violence was distinct from what the 
Nazis conducted elsewhere, which was sanitized and intended to be carried out on an 
industrial scale. Perpetrators in the pogroms used shovels and clubs, and the violence was 
carried out in full view of the town. The perpetrators were often neighbors or landlords. 
This was not a case of ethnic hatred causing perpetrators to mentally dehumanize their 
enemy—the perpetrators were clearly aware of the humanity of their victims. The 
dilemma of ethnic violence is that the violence is not distant, sterile, or sanitized, and so 
one has to acknowledge the humanity of their victims.  
 A majority of the scholarship that focuses on pogroms explores the following few 
explanations: economic rivalry, Jewish collaboration with the Soviet Union, and anti-
Semitism. These explanations do not fully account for the unique nature of these pogroms 
in Poland and the Ukraine. For this reason, we might also explore the case of anti-Jewish 
pogroms through the power-threat theory framework. However, the threat in this 
historical context might best be understood as political rather than cultural. While the 
economic and social capital of Greenwood caused a violent backlash from white Tulsans, 
it was primarily the political threat in Polish and Ukrainian localities that caused the 
massacres to occur. Pogroms did not always occur in communities with sharp cultural 
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divides, or those with Nazis present. In fact, it was often the Nazis who were able to step 
in and mitigate the violence. One of the best approaches to the political valences of the 
power/threat theory is the scholarship of Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg.44 Their 
recent book, Intimate Violence, locates the main cause of this example of ethnic violence 
in political polarization. They theorize that pogroms were a strategy by which non-Jews 
attempted to rid themselves of future political rivals. The deciding factor was the 
popularity of parties supporting minority rights. Kopstein and Wittenberg, after analyzing 
voting data from two thousand localities, find that there are three main factors that 
influence the probability that a pogrom will occur: the support for Polish and Ukrainian 
parties advocating ethnic tolerance, the demographic presence of Jews, and the degree to 
which Jews advocated for national equality with Poles and Ukrainians. The similarity 
between these factors lies in the centrality of Jewish people being suspect for Polish and 
Ukrainian nationalists.  
 The first factor often played itself out between the National Democrats and their 
allies, who sought minimal minority rights, and the pluralist BBWR, Bezpartyjny Blok 
Współpracy z Rządem, which favored minority rights in exchange for loyalty to Poland.45 
While Ukrainians were largely a minority in Poland, they constituted a majority in some 
regions of Galicia and inhabitants felt strongly about their sovereignty from Poles. 
However, they, too, were conflicted about the extent to which Jews should be included in 
their nationalist agenda. If we accept that the power threat theory might meaningfully 
apply to these situations, pogroms were most likely to occur in localities in which 
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popularity of tolerant parties indicated a population supportive of pluralistic nation-
building policies. In these areas, nationalists would feel the threat to their political 
hegemony more keenly. Therefore, it would make sense to attack Jews to delay any 
recognition of their national rights. Of course, according to this theory, there would be no 
pogroms in localities in which Jewish rights were respected. Unsurprisingly, situations 
like this are extremely rare. This is the way in which anti-Semitism and myths of Jewish 
culpability play a key role in collective violence. While ethnic hatred was not the 
defining motivator of the massacres, it created the fragile environment in which political 
fractures could cause brutal violence. 
 The second factor described by Kopstein and Wittenberg is demographic: the 
number of Jewish relative to that of non-Jewish inhabitants. In this reading, the increased 
size of the Jewish population corresponds to a higher chance of a pogrom occurring. This 
was probable for two reasons. First, increased Jewish visibility made Jewish people an 
easier target. Second, simply the numerical increase of Jewish people created a 
substantial threat to Ukrainian and Polish political dominance. A further point of nuance 
with the demographic analysis was the tension within the Jewish community between 
assimilation and cultural autonomy. Jewish people were not able to align themselves 
politically with Polish and Ukrainian nationalists because that would cost them their 
cultural autonomy. Therefore, Jewish people were put in a difficult situation, from which 
they could not emerge without causing distrust. Like the Tulsa Race Massacre, in which 
the economic threat was dependent on cultural autonomy, the Jewish community’s 
political threat was exacerbated by their cultural autonomy. 
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 The third factor is the fraction of Jews that supported recognition of a distinct 
nation equal to that of Poles or Ukrainians. The political cause of Jewish nationalism had 
the least support amongst non-Jews. Minority rights for Jews was unpopular, but the idea 
of Jews wanting to engage fully in political life drew some sympathy. Even non-
nationalist Poles and Ukrainians were hostile to the idea of Jewish self-government and 
comprehensive Hebrew and Yiddish education. Localities in which Jews pushed for 
national equality with a majority group were highly vulnerable to pogroms. Collective 
violence in these situations was especially likely to occur because non-Jews felt the least 
community solidarity and connection with their Jewish neighbors. While Jews were, in 
some senses, segregated from their neighbors, they still existed in the same community. 
Furthermore, the violence was intimate because of how it was carried out- in common 
spaces with shovels and clubs. This not only meant that there was a greater number of 
potential killers, but also a larger number of non-Jews who were willing to be complicit 
in the massacres and not intervene on the behalf of their Jewish neighbors. Kopstein and 
Wittenberg equate Jewish nationalism to the proportion of Jews who supported parties 
advocating minority rights. 
 Even beyond a greater number of potential killers, there were many people who 
were complicit. In cases of collective violence, the role of the non-perpetrators is key. 
This engineers the right “social environment for killing.”46 Not only could non-
perpetrators often intervene or rescue Jews, but perpetrators often would not act violently 
if they did not suspect popular support for their actions. In this way, it was bystanders 
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that set the tone for the community.47 Massacres typically could not occur in situations 
that had some opposition to the violence, especially because they occurred in small 
communities and the massacres required significant community involvement. This was 
especially true in situations in which those who were against violence were community 
leaders, like priests or teachers, or other figures with recognized authority. In most of the 
pogrom situations, however, it seemed that even those who should have had a reason to 
mitigate the violence could not muster sufficient sympathy. This points to the fact that 
even the bare minimum of solidarity was not present between the Jews and non-Jews.  
 The Lwów Pogrom (currently Lviv) in June 1941 is a good example of the role 
that non-perpetrators play in shaping the dynamics of the urban crowd ultimately 
responsible for the violence. Jews were forced to clean the streets on their hands and 
knees, a form of ritual humiliation that was often used in anti-Semitic violence. Women 
were singled out for a special type of violence: they were beaten with sticks and tossed 
from one pogromist to another. Often, they were undressed and ridiculed.48 Jewish people 
were marched to the prison as they were beaten, stoned, and ridiculed by onlookers. It is 
important to note that there were onlookers who did not participate in active violence but 
took part in name calling and served as complicit witnesses.49 Ukrainian nationalists 
played an important role in the violence and felt especially threatened by Jewish 
nationalism.50 Ukrainian militiamen went from house to house to round up Jews for 
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abuse.51 Beyond their motivations for violence, they also had the means to implement it. 
While the Ukrainian nationalists were the initiators of the violence, the crowd was crucial 
in influencing the course of events. It was typical of pogroms for random elements to join 
the violence and perpetuate it, and what happened in Lviv embodies these trends. As 
militiamen marched Jews to prisons, civilians attacked the Jews from the sidelines. The 
militiamen were happy to let the crowd play out its riotous nature and sustain the ritual 
and sexual humiliation of Jews on the streets. The violence perpetuated by the urban 
crowd was doubtless influenced by anti-Semitism and insecurity over the Soviet 
occupation, but the fact that Jews were considered to be “outsiders” of the community, 
were present in large numbers, and were mobilized into their own nation-building 
projects were key elements that allowed this hatred to be acted on. 
 The pogrom in Borysław in November 1941 also depended on the involvement of 
the urban crowd. The carnival atmosphere is present in multiple testimonies describing 
the violence.52 Recorded testimonies describe how murderers were egged on by hysterical 
laughter and cheering by large crowds, and that the atmosphere in the streets was 
generally cheerful, as though celebrating a festival. In Irene Horowitz’s account of the 
violence, Jews were made to dance and perform tricks. Survivors described the town as a 
hunting ground in which Jews were the prey.53 Horowitz goes on to describe how many 
people were killing neighbors and friends that they had known all their lives with pipes 
and shovels in full view of the public. This targeted violence was intimate, but it was also 
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an attempt to remove that source of intimacy and closeness. The aim of the violence was 
to marginalize, and in some cases totally remove, a group perceived to be a threat. 
Narrative of Jewish Culpability and Anti-Semitism As the Motivator 
 
 In the typical method of scholarship approaching the Holocaust, the abstract ideas 
of Jewish culpability and ethnic hatred are seen as key, but Kopstein and Wittenberg 
locate the catalyst in the political threat. The power-threat theory applies itself well to this 
case study, as it does with the Tulsa Race Massacre, because pogroms also occur in a 
situation in which a disenfranchised minority is beginning to fight for its rights. In Tulsa, 
this presented itself primarily via an economic and cultural threat to the racial hegemony. 
In the case of the pogroms, national rights were the key agitator. The cultural threat was 
likely exacerbating the issue, in the sense that Jews would have been willing to settle for 
robust minority rights instead of national rights were they willing to assimilate and lose 
their cultural sovereignty. To be clear, this approach is not meant to discount the real 
implications of anti-Semitism in ethnic violence. Poland and Ukraine’s history are replete 
with anti-Semitic violence and oppression, and Jewish individuals and activists would 
likely not have advocated for minority or national rights without that history. There are 
various historical explanations for the outbreak of pogroms, such as revenge, anti-Semitic 
hatred and Jewish culpability. These approaches have altered the way in which we 
conceive of Jewish history and how we memorialize anti-Semitic violence. The 
power/threat theory intervenes in this problematic discourse.  
 Revenge is one of the most enduring explanations of pogroms. Many believed 
that Jews collaborated with the Soviet Union during the Red Army’s harsh occupation of 
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Poland, and so pogroms could have been a mechanism of revenge for perceived Jewish 
collaboration. This is somewhat consistent with the historical evidence. We cannot be 
sure of how all Jews felt in regard to the Soviet invasion, but many felt relief. Having 
experienced harsh oppression, Soviet occupation offered the opportunity of civic 
equality, as oppressive as it might be in other regards, and was much preferable to Nazi 
rule in western Poland. Any relief that was openly expressed, as rare as that might have 
been, would only have served to exacerbate poor relations. Also, while all groups 
suffered under Soviet occupation, Jewish status increased relative to Polish and Ukrainian 
status because they were suddenly able to be (theoretically) as involved in government as 
Poles or Ukrainians, as limited as that involvement may be. Roger Petersen argues that 
this relative loss of status resulted in a Polish and Ukrainian resentment at their lack of 
national citizenship that primarily drove pogrom violence, regardless of the fact that Jews 
were not responsible for the reversal of fortunes.54 Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, 
Jews were often forced to undergo ritual humiliation during pogroms. Much of the ritual 
humiliation associates them with the Soviet regime- for example, in Siematycze, Jews 
were made to dismantle a Lenin statue with hammers and sickles.55 These incidences 
suggest that non-Jewish populations did blame Jews for the Soviet occupation, given the  
strong association between the symbols of Soviet nation-building. The revenge theory is 
important to analyze for two reasons: first, it is important to explore whether Jewish 
collaboration was legitimately a leading cause of anti-Semitic violence and second, it is 
necessary to explore whether non-Jewish attitudes were pervasive based on the evidence 
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present. These two paths of exploration are necessary because there is an important 
distinction, in terms of culpability and historical memory, between the punishment of 
perceived national traitors and the inhumane persecution of innocents. In the first case, 
while the mode of punishment is inhumane and horrific, one might be able to sympathize 
with the motivating sentiments. In the latter case, there is no defense to be had.  
However, Kopstein and Wittenberg cast significant doubt on the theory of Jewish 
collaboration. Firstly, while some Jews certainly collaborated with the Soviet authorities, 
so did some non-Jews. They examine regional studies to confirm that while Jewish 
fortunes improved relative to other groups, they were still underrepresented in 
administrative posts in absolute and relative terms.56 More influential positions were 
overwhelmingly non-Jewish, and so if pogroms were really about collaboration, they 
should have been aimed at non-Jewish collaborators. This seems to mean that anti-Jewish 
sentiment far outweighed anti-Soviet sentiment when it came to violence, and myths of 
Jewish collaboration have more to do with anti-Jewish stereotypes that existed far before 
Soviet occupation. This nullifies the Jewish collaboration theory and emphasizes the 
distrust of the Jewish population. This chapter argues that this distrust would not have 
turned into violence without the Jewish population being seen as future political rivals. 
Current Relevance: Memorialization in Poland And Germany and Its Consequences 
 
 The enduring causes of collective violence in our historical memory are important 
because they inform our current responses to Jewish culture and, very importantly, the 
tactics deployed for the memorialization of anti-Jewish violence. The Jewish story is not 
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one of endless persecution and doom, even though their community has been historically 
oppressed. It is important that we tell a holistic and rich story that reflects the history of 
the Jewish community in Eastern Europe. Given that the nature of anti-Jewish violence, 
the Holocaust, and pogroms, focused on wiping out a community and a culture, it is 
unsurprising that there is not much evidence left behind. It is difficult to come to a 
consensus on who was responsible for the atrocities committed against the Jewish people. 
Given that anti-Semitism is still very much alive and well, memorialization is 
increasingly important, especially in Germany and Poland, where most of the violence 
was perpetuated. The case studies of Berlin and Warsaw provide an interesting 
comparison for competing projects of memorialization and its implications.  
 Berlin is a city with a layered history and has a wealth of memorials dedicated to 
its past, primarily World War II and the Cold War. After World War II, memorialization 
became an important policy priority in terms of reconciling German culpability. “The 
term Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which literally translates as ‘coping with the past,’ has 
become a key concept in post-1945 German culture and describes the way in which 
Germans discuss and confront their history.”57 It was reunification in 1990 that really 
began the trend of memorialization. Germany was the first to recognize a national day of 
remembrance for the Holocaust. The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe is the 
most famous of Germany’s memorials and the most controversial. It has been criticized 
as failing to address the suffering of the individual victims of the Holocaust, and for 
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allowing the suffering to be anonymous.58 Many have argued that the abstract and 
symbolic nature of the memorial allows the horrific nature of the violence to be buried. 
Well-known German political commentator Hendrik M. Broder states, the Memorial is 
“not meant to commemorate the Jews,” but rather “is meant to flatter the Germans.”59 
Critics also argue that the title evades culpability, given that it does not answer the 
question of “murdered by whom?” In defense of the memorial, some have argued that its 
abstract nature allows German citizens to gain a sense of collective responsibility because 
they are able to interpret the 
memorial as they want. 
Peter Eisenman, the creative 
force behind the monument, 
was intentional in its design. 
He wanted an abstract 
monument because he felt that a traditional design would be inadequate for capturing the 
varied atrocities of the Holocaust. He believes that the viewer does not have to fully 
understand the memorial, because understanding the history behind it is impossible, and 
the memorial allows viewers to accept evil as a part of the natural world.60  
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 The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe is Berlin’s most visible memorial, 
but most other attempts at memorialization were woven into the landscape of the city. 
One of these is the Places of Remembrance memorial, which consists of 80 signposts, 
each displaying a different anti-Semitic law from Nazi Germany. Another one of these 
are the “Stumbling Blocks,” cobblestone-sized brass plates inscribed with the name and 
available information about victims of the Holocaust scattered throughout the streets of 
the city where Jews resided and worked. These memorials were also met with 
controversy, but many inhabitants are appreciative of the German government’s attempts 
to acknowledge its violent history.  
 Warsaw’s approach to memorialization is not as robust as Berlin’s, and far more 
recent. Public memorials do not exist and walking through Warsaw one would never 
know what had happened in those very streets just 75 years ago. Warsaw’s architecture 
does not suggest the past harshness of an anti-Semitic regime or the existence of a Jewish 
ghetto. One of the main differences between Warsaw and Berlin’s approaches to 
memorialization is that the German government chose to make memorialization a 
priority, whereas the Polish government remained largely uninvolved. This is likely 
largely because Polish governments since the end of World War II have often been right 
wing, anti-Semitic, or both, and more interested in suppressing Poland’s ugly past than 
acknowledging it. Warsaw’s attempts at memorialization have been pushed by private 
actors and nonprofits.  
One of the main examples of this is the Polin Museum in Warsaw, which 
celebrates a thousand year history of Poland’s Jewish people. The museum is one of the 
main institutions in Warsaw that acts as a prism into Warsaw’s past, as well as an 
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educational force for those who would like to engage with Jewish culture. It was pushed 
by the Association of the Jewish Historical Institute of Poland for many years before 
garnering some support from the 
Polish government in 2005. Still, 
the museum is constantly under 
threat from various laws enacted by 
the Polish government since its 
opening in 2014. For example, in 
February of 2018, the Polish 
President decided to support a law 
“making it illegal to accuse ‘the Polish nation’ of complicity in the Holocaust and other 
Nazi atrocities,” which is effectively historical revisionism.61   
 Berlin’s Jewish population is the fastest growing in Europe.62 Once the epicenter 
of horrific anti-Semitic violence, the city welcomes thousands of young Israelis yearly. 
Meanwhile, Jews in Poland have been concerned with Holocaust denialism and anti-
Semitism for many years. While much of this difference comes from having a left wing 
versus right wing government, there is something to be said for Berlin’s collective 
memory versus Warsaw’s. While anti-Semitism is still present in Berlin, it is difficult to 
deny a historical event that so thoroughly consumes the architecture of your city. On the 
other hand, if one were to grow up in Warsaw, all education about Poland’s bloody past 
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requires one to opt in. There are no public memorials, and historical education in schools 
does not discuss anti-Semitism. Berlin’s citizens have a far more democratic access to 
historical education.  
 Memorialization and historical memory as a whole are key to avoiding future 
mass violence. This is clear not only from Berlin and Warsaw’s different cultures, but 
also from exploring how pogroms were motivated. A historical enmity easily shifts into 
violence in times of political pressure and crisis, and a clear historical record is important 
to combat dangerous and divisive historical myths. Perhaps there would have been less 
violence, or less humiliation during the violence of pogroms, had the non-Jewish people 
not linked Jews with communism, or had they not believed the Jewish collaboration 
myth. Poland’s example also shows us that without historical memory, it is easy for 
political elites to distort the past to serve their own ends. In the worst case scenario, 
political elites can distort the past to divide communities and spark violence.  
  
44 
 
Violence as A Result of Nationalism: Pakistan/India Partition Violence 
 
“Two or three years after the 1947 Partition, it occurred to the governments of 
India and Pakistan to exchange their lunatics in the same manner as they had 
exchanged their criminals. The Muslim lunatics in India were to be sent over to 
Pakistan and the Hindu and Sikh lunatics in Pakistani asylums were to be handed 
over to India. 
 
It was difficult to say whether the proposal made any sense or not. However, the 
decision had been taken at the topmost level on both sides.”  
Toba Tek Singh by Saadat Hasan Manto 
Political Elite Theory and Nationalist Rhetoric 
 
 In August 1947, the British left after three hundred years and the subcontinent 
was partitioned into India and Pakistan. This began one of the largest migrations in 
human history, as millions of Muslims headed to Pakistan in search of a better life, a life 
in which they would be the majority. Millions of Hindus and Sikhs, in search of the same 
thing, headed in the opposite direction, seeking the safety of the Hindu-majority state. In 
theory, this separation did not matter. Pakistan and India have more in common with each 
other than any other country on the planet, politically, culturally, and socially. 
Economically, they were inextricable. Strategically, Pakistan had the only land invasion 
routes to India. The Indian Army, soon to be divided, had fought as one for a century. 
Hindu and Muslim soldiers swore oaths of undying brotherhood, Hindu and Muslim 
politicians had spent years fighting against the British together and had families that had 
spent decades socializing with each other.  
 And yet, over seventy years later, Partition’s bloody legacy still haunts India, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Across the subcontinent, communities that had coexisted for 
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almost a millennium, as friends and neighbors, attacked each other in what amounted to a 
mutual genocide. This violence was especially horrific in Punjab, with massacres, arson, 
forced conversions, mass abductions and barbaric sexual violence. Refugee trains arrived 
at their destinations full of corpses, foot caravans of unarmed and poor refugees were 
subject to guerilla 
ambushes. Estimates of 
the dead, though the 
range is wide (between 
200,000 to two 
million), are 
universally shocking. 
The carnage, though 
appalling, was 
relatively confined to a 
period of six weeks. Although the worst of the violence was confined to a limited period, 
by 1948, more than fifteen million people had been uprooted and up to two million were 
dead.  
Partition is central to modern identity in the Indian subcontinent and omnipresent 
in the regional consciousness. While Partition was horrific and seared into many 
memories in South Asia, what truly continues to haunt today’s world is the legacy of 
Partition. The fears, suspicions, and hatreds forged through the vicious carnage continue 
to haunt the region. Leaders on both sides would blame each other for, at best, not doing 
enough to contain the violence, and at worst, encouraging it. This distrust would persist, 
Credits: Creative Commons 
Figure 6: A special refugee train at Ambala Station in February 1954 in 
northern India. The 1947 Partition of India resulted in the largest human 
migration in history, lasting years.  
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exacerbating the regional conflicts and growing pains of two young nations, each eager to 
establish themselves on the world stage, until it would bring the two countries to the 
brink of a war less than a year later, and many times after that. Many characterize the 
subcontinent’s current problems as part of postcolonial dynamics, and while this does 
cause a significant proportion of the troubles, Partition’s legacy caused Pakistan to 
develop a deep seated paranoia about India’s ability to snuff out Pakistan’s existence. 
Certainly, this sentiment was the more powerful of the two. And in 1948 especially, 
Pakistan, almost drowning under the never-ending waves of refugees and a collapsing 
government and economy, there was a sense that the country could not survive. The 
unresolved existential insecurity that Pakistan has suffered since Partition because of the 
“Indian threat,” and Pakistan and India’s rising religious nationalism, pose a legitimate 
threat to not only regional, but global, stability. 
While much of the paranoia was just that, leaders on both sides had reason to 
believe that the other side might be winking at genocide. In the case of Partition violence, 
political elites hold significant responsibility in, firstly, creating the conditions for 
horrific sectarian violence, and secondly, encouraging it. The creation of conditions came 
from the very top: Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Mahatma Gandhi, and Jawarlal Nehru. These 
men chose to stir up religious frenzy for political gain and their personal egos. The 
encouragement of violence typically did not come from the highest echelons of the Indian 
National Congress or All India Muslim League, but still did arise from political officials 
within the parties. Sikhs were also encouraged to attack Muslims by their leaders, but for 
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the purposes of this case study, that is not the primary focus given that they were not part 
of a nationalist movement.  
Political elites manipulated religious 
loyalties to create nationalist ties. Religious 
animosity had always existed, exacerbated by 
decades of colonial rule and the British’s age-
old “divide and rule” stratagem.63 The British 
had spent decades defining communities strictly 
and attaching political representation to them, 
politicizing and worsening religious difference. 
Gandhi was able to play on these stark religious 
divides to build a following as early as the 
1920s. The Muslim League picked up a similar 
strategy after the 1937 elections, using identity 
markers to shape a nationalist Muslim identity. 
The value of Partition as a case study in 
collective violence is that by mapping its 
history, we are able to uncover how political elites are able to create civilian led violence 
without a direct call to violence and explore how collective violence can be inspired by 
nationalist ideology rather than just ethnic or religious strife. Although we must also 
recognize, as with previous cases, that identity doubtless also played a foundational role.  
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Figure 7: Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Ali Jinnah  
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The Sikhs retained a historical fear of Muslim domination. Historical truths had 
power amongst the Sikhs, who adhered to a martially-defined faith, and many of their 
founding myths were dominated by Muslim oppression of their gurus.64 Mughal rule 
from 1526 to 1857 only reinforced Sikh fears of Muslim domination, and so with 
Partition nearing, Sikhs were not in favor of a Muslim separatist movement creating a 
divide in their home state. Since then, thousands of Sikhs trained and fought in World 
War II, and many of them retained their uniforms and weapons. This is to say, within the 
biggest state being divided by Partition, a uniformed army lay in wait, ready to mobilize 
at the slightest provocation. Muhammad Ali Jinnah seemed to be perfectly happy to 
provide that provocation.  
Jinnah, by nature, was a moderate nationalist. In the early part of the twentieth 
century, Jinnah was a member of the Congress party and a staunch supporter of 
League/Congress unity. Initially, he was not a separatist. He generally held disdain for 
the dangerous religious frenzy that he thought had confused Indian politics and 
endangered the independence movement. Jinnah eventually resigned from the Congress 
for this reason once Gandhi took over. Jinnah privately hoped that the parting would be 
temporary, but was worried about Gandhi’s methods, the religious frenzy he created, and 
the religious militancy of the Muslims he attracted.65 Jinnah found Gandhi to be 
dangerously sectarian. He would frame his political arguments in religious terms, framing 
the need for an independent India in the words of Hindu fables. He talked of “Ram 
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Rajya,” a mythical ideal state of government under the god Ram.66 Jinnah found this talk 
to be little more than theatrics, an appeal to emotion. However, Jinnah worried about 
inflaming Muslims more than he did Hindus. Mullahs across the subcontinent were 
threatening to launch a jihad movement against the British to support the Khilafat67 in 
Turkey. This “Khilafat” movement attracted what Jinnah considered to be fanatics and 
rough edged Muslims.68 Jinnah was certain that this rage would inevitably turn from the 
British to Hindus. However, Gandhi did not have the same concerns. Needing Muslim 
votes to launch his Satyagraha movement, he threw his support behind the Khilafat 
movement. 
Jinnah’s desire to unite Muslims and work with Congress was clearer in 1935, 
with the discussion around the 1935 Act.69 The British were relying on this Act to 
strengthen Britain’s hold over India, and so the Congress and the League had a common 
interest in breaking up the provincial system of inter-regional politics upon which the 
British depended. Jinnah stressed the importance of Muslim unity in this moment—if the 
Muslims were able to form a solid voting bloc, they would be able to transform 
themselves from a group perpetually on the margins to a group that the Congress would 
have to bargain with. It was in this moment that it crystallized that Muslims, regardless of 
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political views or background, had to fall in line behind a single leader.70 Although it was 
not immediately clear at the outset, it was Jinnah who would fill this role. Ayesha Jalal 
convincingly makes the case that “Jinnah is not only a rather unorthodox Muslim, but 
also a ‘sole spokesman,’ a nationalist in quest of his nation. For him, Islam provided the 
cultural basis for an ideology of ethnic nationalism to mobilize the Muslim majority to 
defend the ‘minoritarian Muslims’”.71 
The 1937 elections marked an important turning point. The League was forced to 
adopt a new line after being rebuffed by the Congress and suffering a humiliating defeat 
in the elections.72 The elections had made it clear that the League did not have popular 
support and their goal in 1935 for Muslims to unite behind a single leader and slogan had 
become irrelevant. In a bid to speak for the Muslims of India, in 1940 the League 
formally demanded a separate Muslim state. This was Jinnah’s decision, coming from his 
desire to speak for all Indian Muslims, not just Muslims in the minority provinces where 
the League had achieved their success in the 1937 elections, but also the Muslims in 
provinces where they had been unequivocally rejected.  
This was the beginning of the League’s successful movement to create a new 
Muslim identity and to serve as its spokespersons. As mentioned earlier, they began to 
use identity markers to forge a new nationalist Muslim identity.73 Core to the 
manipulation of cultural symbols was not only Islam, but Urdu as a linguistic identity. 
The ideologues of the Muslim League worked hard to present this as the language for 
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Muslims, even though it was almost indistinguishable from Hindi as a spoken language. 
This clearly indicates an important pattern in nation-building, in that the initial Pakistani 
identity was not inherent, but a construction. The mobilization of these identity markers 
helped Muslim separatism to gain a foothold, at the same time as the Congress was using 
symbols like the sacred cow to create a Hindu nationalist frenzy.  
Jinnah’s decision to pursue Partition ruffled feathers all around, from other 
Muslim leaders to Congress leaders to the British, but perhaps the most dangerous was 
the Sikh frustration that ensued.74 As early as January 1939, a British intelligence report 
predicted that “the Sikhs to a man would fight literally to the death rather than to submit 
to Muslim domination.”75 Punjab was a powder keg ready to explode as it was, with all 
parties seriously preparing for a civil war, but the most serious were the Sikh activities by 
far.76 The violence that ensued had been organized and ordered from the highest levels of 
Sikh leadership.77 Jinnah, in his desire to seize political control of Punjab, pushed his 
followers to organize and demonstrate. The disobedience movement grew as days passed, 
and protesters became more and more bold. Jinnah ignored the warnings that protests 
were in danger of becoming violent and continued to push his supporters to continue to 
protest. Unsurprisingly, they did turn violent, and as they did, Hindus and Sikhs grew 
more resentful and more frustrated. Tara Singh, who occupied the highest levels of Sikh 
leadership, pushed Sikhs to form fighting units. This was a key moment in which Jinnah 
pushed aside caution in a moment of ego and defensive nation-building and created the 
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perfect conditions for later massacres. The Sikhs should never have been provoked and 
threatened. 
There were several key moments that led to the massacres in 1946, apart from the 
religious/nationalist frenzy that leaders created with their charged rhetoric. Jinnah’s 
establishment as the “sole spokesman” for all Muslims was one of these, as was his 
subsequent disillusionment with the Congress. Jinnah’s transformation from moderate 
nationalist to a man who was willing to use religion to achieve his political aims was 
perhaps the most important moment in terms of Partition violence. Of course, without 
him, there would be no Partition, but even if there was, Muslims might not have engaged 
in the violence or provoked Hindus and Sikhs in the ways that did. There would have 
been violence anyway, on account of ethnic strife that had been ongoing for decades, but 
probably not to the same degree. Jinnah’s new line was that the Hindu dominated 
Congress could not be trusted and would put Islam in danger, and Muslims needed their 
own nation. This message worked. Pirs (term used to describe spiritual guides in the Sufi 
faith) were attracted to the promise of their own nation and attracted Muslim masses to 
the League. The Hindus had had a movement inciting religious frenzies since 1915, the 
Sikhs had been historically threatened by Muslims, and now the Muslims had a united 
political movement based on religion and separatism. 
Each side had cause to fight, and very soon, each side also had uniformed fanatics 
and provocations towards mob rule. The 1946 Calcutta Killings78 was the first massacre 
after which Nehru and Jinnah might have become aware of what was to follow. However, 
 
78 Direct Action Day (16 August 1946), also known as the 1946 Calcutta Killings, was a day of 
widespread communal rioting between Muslims and Hindus in the city of Calcutta. The day also 
marked the start of what is known as The Week of the Long Knives. 
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the path of violence was not inevitable. The Calcutta Killings happened on the 16th of 
August, 1946. The next bout of violence was in Noakhali, months later. As isolated 
incidents, these were not particularly worrying, especially since they seemed confined to 
the subcontinent’s eastern corner. However, Muslim propogandists showed up across 
India’s northern provinces with photographs of corpses and charred pages of the Qur’an 
that they claimed Hindus had burnt in Bihar and Calcutta. League officials in Punjab 
were already stockpiling weapons and recruiting Muslim university students for 
“underground secret work.”79 
Noakhali created a huge boost for 
Hindu militants’ members numbers. 
As the uproar around it increased, the 
police noticed that the Hindu 
Mahasabha and other orthodox Hindu 
parties, which previously “had very 
little following or political influence,” 
were coming “out into the open and… rallying Hindus all over the country to fight 
Islam.” Tales of Hindu women being violated by Muslim men were a powerful recruiting 
tool.80  
It was in this tense setting that Jinnah was encouraging his followers to create a 
disobedience movement in Punjab, and in this environment that he ignored warnings that 
protests might turn bloody.81 Khizar’s government in Punjab banned all demonstrations 
 
79Hajari, Midnight's Furies, 64. 
80Hajari, Midnight's Furies, 58. 
81Hajari, Midnight's Furies, 72, 74, 81. 
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Figure 8: A convoy of Sikhs migrating to East Punjab in 
October, 1947. 
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in the province, but it was too late. And anyway, Jinnah had been Khizar’s foe for years, 
fighting for political control of Punjab, and this mandate, if anything, provided more 
incentive for the disobedience movement.82 Now it would serve as a means to settle a 
personal vendetta as well as gain political control. Is it any surprise that 1946 saw dozens 
of massacres in Punjab, and in 1947, when refugees would try to cross the Punjabi 
border, they would be witness to a horrific mutual genocide? 
Historical Myths, Patriotism, and Nationalism 
 
In this environment, and against the backdrop of years of fierce political 
arguments, it is not surprising that there was some distrust and animosity between the 
new leaders of India and Pakistan. Pakistan held a deep fear that India would try and 
destroy the state before it even got a chance to exist. This was not wholly surprising. 
India, at many points, refused to give Pakistan the funding or supplies that were 
promised. Gandhi’s hunger strike, 
right before his assassination, was 
on the grounds that India was 
trying to starve her sister state 
into submission by not handing 
over the 550 million rupees that 
Pakistan had been promised. 
Without the threat of Gandhi 
starving, it is not clear that the money would ever have been handed over. And even 
 
82 Hajari, Midnight's Furies, 74. 
Credit: The Hindu Archive 
Figure 9: Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Mahatma Gandhi  
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though Gandhi did not starve to death, his hunger strike did eventually kill him. To Hindu 
and Sikh extremists, the only outcome of the hunger strike was a richer Pakistan. And so, 
on the 30th of January 1948, Nathuram Vinayak Godse, an editor of a Hindu nationalist 
newspaper and a member of the nationalist political party, the Hindu Mahasabha and 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh,83 shot Gandhi three times at point blank range. 
Unfortunately, the idea that India hoped to “strangle” the new state of Pakistan 
developed a permanent hold over the consciousness of Pakistanis. It was no longer a 
suspicion held by top government officials but a widely held belief across class and 
occupational divides. This animosity and fear came out most clearly over the Kashmir 
question. By November 1949, UN mapmakers drew a ceasefire line in Kashmir that 
would eventually develop into the Line of Control that still stands. The idea that 
Pakistanis must defy their neighbor for the country’s survival became a national mission 
and, according to a visiting journalist, seemed to be the “cement that holds Pakistan 
together.”84 Any compromise on Kashmir seemed impossible, and Nehru did not help 
with compromise. He offered 
few concessions on Kashmir 
during his tenure as prime 
minister. This was not 
surprising, given Nehru’s 
strange and romantic obsession 
 
83Neena Vyas, “RSS Releases `proof’ of Its Innocence,” The Hindu, August 18, 2004, sec. 
NATIONAL, https://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/rss-releases-proof-of-its-
innocence/article27655353.ece. Exact dates of his membership are unknown. 
84Hajari, Midnight's Furies, 256. 
Credit: Rich Clabaugh/Staff 
Figure 10: Map of Pakistan/India border and Kashmir, showing 
the Line of Control  
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with Kashmir. In a letter to Edwina Mountbatten he described his feelings for Kashmir as 
“a mild intoxication.”85 But Kashmir to India was much more than just one man’s dream. 
Kashmir became the stage for a powerful morality play. If the predominantly Muslim 
kingdom of Kashmir chose to join a predominantly Hindu nation, Nehru would be able to 
deal a fatal blow to Jinnah’s ideology. A victory in Kashmir was symbolic, it meant a 
national triumph of one sister state over another.  
India could afford a stalemate—it started out on better footing and had a larger 
economy and more stable institutions. Nehru’s tenure in office for a decade and a half 
and his emphasis on centralized planning gave India a stability that Pakistan would never 
achieve after Jinnah’s death in 1948. After Jinnah’s death, a series of weak leaders took 
their turns trying to govern. All the troubles that Jinnah had brushed aside or held at bay 
flared up. This, in turn, led to more religious rhetoric. Unworthy political leaders, trying 
to restore their ability to govern and silence opposition, continued to push the idea that 
Islam was a threat.86 Regional tensions, class resentments, various social and political 
divides stalled government progress and held the door wide open for the Pakistani army 
to walk in.  
The military was by far the most powerful and competent institution in Pakistan, 
and the most well-funded. The military had been resentful over how the civilian 
government halted fighting in Kashmir and had been vying for control since 1951. Seven 
years later, a second attempt succeeded, this time led by General Ayub Khan. This 
marked the beginning of a long string of military leaders. The dominance of the army 
 
85 Hajari, Midnight's Furies, 231. 
86Hamza Alavi, “On Religion and Secularism in the Making of Pakistan” (Professor Karrar 
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57 
 
required a justification, and they kept trying to create one: incompetent civil leaders, 
ethnic strife, regional tensions. In the end, the most effective one was the Indian threat. 
The Pakistani army elevated the threat from their neighbor to explain the need for the 
military to lead. It led to a horrific cycle and a self-fulfilling prophecy. The army’s 
misadventures led to heightened tensions with India, India would humiliate Pakistan on 
the battlefield, and the Pakistani army would then find more excuses to engage to regain 
national honor. Their string of losses meant that Pakistani leaders, once again turned to 
Islam as a rallying cry. Pakistan’s secular elite struck a bargain with Pakistan’s mullahs 
to promote religious fervor and antipathy towards India as a means to unite Pakistanis 
behind military leaders. In this way, in Pakistan’s formative years, leaders from 
politicians to civil servants to the military, used Islam to define an identity for Pakistan. 
Even those who did not actively push this accepted Islam as a politico-military strategic 
doctrine. 
Current Relevance: Legacy Formation as A Motivator for The Kashmir Conflict 
 
In the 1980s, this dynamic intensified under Dictator Zia ul-Haq. He embarked on 
a policy called Islamization, funding madrassas, regulating education to include more 
Islamic learning, and rewarding devout officers. He also began Pakistan’s path of 
sponsoring extremist militants like the Afghan jihadists and the Lakshar-i-Taliban to 
conduct proxy wars in order to establish itself strategically on the world stage. The use of 
these unpredictable forces that Pakistan does not have to answer for have, unsurprisingly, 
soured relations even further with India. The extremist militants also very quickly spun 
out of Pakistan’s control, developing into a considerable force in their own right, capable 
58 
 
of causing problems for Pakistan and the world at large. The tensions between India and 
Pakistan do nothing positive for either party, limiting trade and creating unnecessary 
military tensions, but both sides continue to stoke nationalist frenzy for political gain. 
What the military has done in Pakistan, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has 
done in India. The RSS is dedicated to the propagation of “Hindutva,” the idea that India 
is a nation for Hindus, above all else. While Nehru and Gandhi laid the groundwork of a 
nationalist Hindu ideology, they were still committed to a secular state. By 1947 
standards, the RSS is an extremist party. It was popularized as the Nehru-Gandhi family 
dynasty and the Congress lost popularity and were cast as out of touch and nepotist. The 
RSS’s political branch, the Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, found support primarily 
through nationalist stunts to stir religious passions.87 Even with the downfall of the 
Congress and the uptick in Hindu nationalism, the BJP did not quite grab the national 
spotlight until Narendra Modi became the central figure.88  
Modi is, and always has been, explicitly and defiantly anti-Muslim. In 2002, when 
he was the Chief Minister of the Gujarati government, he did not stop the Gujarat Muslim 
massacres. In fact, as he received (limited) backlash, he led a Hindu pride march through 
Gujarat, calling the state’s Muslims schemers, and an obstacle to overcome.89 Modi can 
play on the hateful legacy of Partition. Many believe that India’s Muslims are terrorists 
and want the downfall of the state—Modi became a hero for Indians who felt threatened. 
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Modi knew what all Indian leaders before him: the instrumentalization of “vicious 
sectarian rhetoric, the country’s leader could persuade Hindus to give him nearly 
unchecked power.”90 Modi’s actions during the Gujarat massacres led him to the Prime 
Minister’s office. The riot’s victims were predominantly Muslim and led to Muslims 
being pushed into slums. Besides allowing the killings to continue, Modi also gained 
politically. He was able to tap into “historic resentments about the nation’s former 
Mughal rulers and prejudices harbored by many Hindus—namely, that Muslims receive 
special treatment and support terrorism.”91 Modi’s popularity that won him the Prime 
Minister’s office was transparently because of, and on the backs of, dead Muslims. 
Why does the legacy of Partition matter? The animosity that Partition created, that 
leaders have stoked and hardened, directly causes current violence throughout the 
subcontinent. Pakistan’s use of extremist militants has destabilized the country, which in 
turn destabilizes the region and the world, especially when considering Pakistan’s 
growing stockpile of nuclear weapons. Pakistan continues to fund and support the 
Lashkar-i-Taliban, even with the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban, a group dedicated 
to overthrowing the Pakistani government and that has successfully carried out terrorist 
attacks on army bases, Inter-Services Intelligence headquarters and airports. These 
terrorist forces, with and without government sanction, wage a proxy war in Kashmir, 
provoking Indian forces and an Indian government that does not need provocation to take 
extreme measures. Modi’s government, and its emphasis on Hindutva, allows Muslims to 
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be killed by mobs all over the country, and in August 2019, revoked Article 37092, and 
occupied Kashmir. The Indian government deployed its forces on all street corners, shut 
down internet and telephone services, regional leaders were placed under house arrest, 
and tourists were told to leave. 
In the same month, the government created a citizenship registry in Assam, 
rendering thousands of Muslims stateless, and announced a plan to open detention centers 
for Muslims. In December, the Indian government passed the Citizenship Amendment 
Act (CAA), a law that creates a path to citizenship for immigrants of different faiths 
except Muslims. The law, 
although unsurprising, marks an 
important legislative separation in 
the identities of “Indian” and 
“Muslim.” This is more deeply 
pernicious than many realize. A 
deeper look at the list of 
immigrants reveals the larger point 
Modi’s government is trying to 
make. The bill pretends to support minorities from South Asia- but it only accepts 
minorities (except Muslims) from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan. It is not open 
to immigrants from countries like Sri Lanka, China, and Myanmar, even though Sri 
Lanka has a large group of persecuted Hindus in need of protection (Tamils). Pakistan, 
 
92Article 370 of the Indian constitution gave special status to Jammu and Kashmir—conferring it 
with the power to have a separate constitution, a state flag and autonomy over the internal 
administration of the state. 
Credit: Adnan Abidi / Reuters 
Figure 11: Peaceful protesters against the new citizenship law 
are met with force in every case  
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Bangladesh, and Afghanistan are officially Muslim countries, while China, Sri Lanka, 
and Myanmar are not. In choosing which nationalities to allow, the Indian government 
has set up Islam as the oppressor. Only minorities from Muslim countries are in need of 
Indian support.93 Unlike Indian actions in Kashmir and Assam, this led to widespread 
protests. Indians took to the streets to protest the legislation. The protests went on for 
months, and in February of 2020, protests over the CAA triggered mob violence across 
Delhi. Hindu mobs chanted “Jai Shri Ram,” a BJP slogan that translates as “Glory to 
Lord Ram,”94 as they went on a rampage through Delhi, attacking and killing Muslims 
and destroying property. Police officers stood idly by, no doubt instructed not to 
intervene, and in many cases joined in. One video caught cops smashing CCTV cameras, 
while another showed them helping men gather stones to throw.95 For context, when 
Muslim protesters at Jamia University got “unruly,” the police stormed the university and 
arrested students. The Delhi police are controlled by the Home Ministry, which is run by 
Amit Shah, Modi’s closest advisor and the second most powerful man in India. Shah has 
run into trouble in the past for ordering extra-judicial killings. His investigation, pushed 
by renowned Indian journalist Rana Ayyub,96 came to a halt when a series of judges were 
pressured by the Modi government to drop the charges.97 
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Like in Gujarat in 2002, Modi watched as Delhi burned. As Hindu nationalists, 
many members of his party, killed Muslims and his police force did not stop them, Modi 
served Donald Trump gold-leaf-
crusted mandarin oranges at the 
Presidential Palace.98 This was, 
however, unsurprising. Months of 
peaceful protests by Muslims were 
met with tear gas, house raids, 
arbitrary detentions, police 
brutality, and Internet shutdowns. 
Modi’s colleagues suggested in 
speeches that the protesters should be shot. A BJP politician named Kapil Mishra gave an 
ultimatum to the police: clear the roads of protesters or allow his followers to do so. The 
BJP’s party line, stoking ethnic animosity, calling for force, labeling opponents “traitors” 
gives Hindu nationalists the confidence to incite violence and the assurance that they will 
never be punished. And they are right to be assured, the Indian government has turned a 
blind eye to Muslim lynching for years. The pattern of political elites creating ideal 
conditions for violence has simply intensified in the twenty-first century. Nehru and 
Jinnah may be at blame for starting the trend, but they did not explicitly call for violence. 
And it goes on, the Pakistani government makes questionable security decisions 
based on a historical insecurity, and the Indian government does not acknowledge 
Muslims as Indians. A pattern emerges. The spiral of historical animosity worsens and 
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Figure 12: People supporting the new citizenship law beat a 
Muslim man while police watch. 
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intensifies. In India, the BJP have been rewriting school textbooks, erasing India’s 
significant Islamic history. But even without a concerted effort to rewrite textbooks, 
Pakistan and India’s students are not learning a similar history. History textbooks reflect 
national sentiments, with wars being blamed squarely on the other country and opposing 
views being villainized. Bollywood films are increasingly Islamophobic. Mughal history 
is villainized. There are calls to demolish the Taj Mahal.99 
The history that the next generation of Pakistanis and Indians are learning reflects 
age old historical myths, and further reinforces the furies of Partition.100 But even if 
education worked to uncover the truth, in countries with a majority of the population 
being illiterate, political elites can sell any story. This was made clear with Modi’s 
reelection campaign, heavily reliant on fake stories and propaganda. In the same way that 
political elites in Pakistan and India have intentionally and historically worked to divide 
and win, it will take a few leaders to have the courage to bridge the divide. But political 
courage has been lacking for decades, and does not seem to be on the horizons, even as 
the subcontinent seems to be steadily moving towards a tipping point. 
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Violence as a Result of Colonial Rule: Rwandan Genocide 
“Where does evil come from? 
what do you mean “where” 
 
from a human being 
always a human being 
and only a human being” 
“Unde malum?” by Joanna Trzeciak 
 
Hutu Disenfranchisement and Group Fractures Under Belgian Rule 
 
 On April 7, 1994, the Hutu majority of Rwanda turned on the Tutsi minority in a 
wave of violence that swept the country and left almost a million people dead. Lasting 
only about 100 days, the Rwandan genocide is one of the quickest and most unthinkable 
waves of violence in history. Within hours of the airplane carrying the Hutu president, 
Juvenal Habyarimana, being shot down, the killing had started. Elite government forces 
and the Hutu militia, the Interahamwe, rounded up Tutsi military and political leaders and 
executed them. Roadblocks were set up to identify Rwandans whose official IDs marked 
them as Tutsi (a policy introduced in the 1930s by the Belgian colonial authorities).101 
People were murdered enmasse in churches, homes, fields, and checkpoints. In rural 
areas, where Hutus and Tutsis were neighbors, friends, and inter-married, government 
propaganda was a call to arms.   
What makes the Rwandan genocide so unthinkable is its popular and intimate 
nature. None of the other case studies constitute a genocide, they are massacres. Having a 
genocide be part of collective action, and civilian led, is far more confusing than pogroms 
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or massacres. A genocide is an attempt to wipe out a people. The Holocaust was 
conducted by a few people, even though many were complicit, and it was a form of 
institutionalized violence. The killing camps were relatively removed from the view of 
civilians, and Nazis often just had to press a button to operate gas chambers. The 
Rwandan genocide, by contrast, was carried out by friends and neighbors, and the most 
popular weapon was a machete. It takes several hacks of a machete to kill a person, 
perhaps one of the most “intimate” acts of violence possible. The Rwandan genocide 
would not have succeeded without hundreds of thousands of perpetrators, and millions of 
complicit witnesses. Long standing interethnic ties should limit, not facilitate, 
participation in mass violence, but the Rwandan genocide throws that theory to the 
wind.102 
 The violence of the 
genocide had to be the result 
of both planning and 
participation. The agenda was 
undoubtedly proposed from 
above, but deeply resonated 
with perspectives from below, 
and it was the combination 
that created the horrific 
reality. The popular violence would have been sporadic and disjointed without guidance 
from above, and the call to violence from above would have gone unanswered without 
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Figure 13: Thousands of abandoned machetes at the border 
between Rwanda and Tanzania. Hutu refugees were allowed 
to cross on the condition they left behind their weapons. 
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the support from below. And it is the support from below, and its popularity, that is the 
disturbing part of the genocide. Similarly, to the Hindu/Muslim violence from the past 
chapter, the genocide was not just a state aspect. It tapped into real historical grievances. 
These historical grievances can be explained by exploring the legacy of colonialism and 
postcolonial politics. 
 The urge to destroy an enemy is understandable, but the question is: how does the 
enemy come to be defined? In the Rwandan context, the Tutsi minority came to be 
defined as alien. The Tutsi minority came to be seen as a settler population, almost 
analogous with the Belgian colonists. The elimination of the settlers by the natives, the 
Hutus, is easier to understand because it is a violence perpetrated by victims. Yesterday’s 
victims become tomorrow’s perpetrators. Frantz Fanon demonstrates this point in his 
suggestion that native violence as a response to prior violence, more as violence to end 
violence, rather than the perpetuation of a cycle of continued fresh violence.103  
 The key aspect of the Rwandan genocide (and the Holocaust) is race branding.104 
To explain this, Mahmood Mamdani’s analysis is important. Race branding not only 
allows a population to easily define and “other” a population, but also to exterminate it 
with an easy conscience. To understand how this race branding came to be, it is crucial to 
think through the political systems that colonialism set up. Colonialism created a binary 
settler/native dynamic. The colonial context defined Tutsis as a group with a privileged 
relationship to power. The post-colonial political context then constructed them as a 
privileged alien settler presence through the revolution of 1959 and then through Hutu 
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Power propaganda after 1990.105 Even though neighbors were killing neighbors, the 
genocide was constructed as a cleansing of foreigners rather than neighbors.  
 German rule began in 1898, and simultaneous to their entry was the entry of the 
Catholic Church. The White Fathers tried to establish good relations with the leadership, 
hoping that if they converted, the population would follow. Yuhi Musinga, the new 
mwami (king), was hostile to them and only granted them land under German pressure.106 
After Germany’s defeat in World War I, the Belgians took over the region that includes 
modern day Rwanda and Burundi, and, unlike the Germans, immediately began exerting 
pressures on the mwami. They were highly impressed with the strict social hierarchy they 
found and began to take steps to make it into a clear political hierarchy. The mwami 
oscillated between being cooperative and hostile, and so the Belgians deposed him.  
 It was Belgian colonial reform from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s that 
constructed Hutus as indigenous Bantu and Tutsi as alien Hamites. Part of this 
construction was the colonial discourse of the Hamitic hypothesis, which posits that all 
civilization in Africa is a foreign import. Mamdani argues that both Hutu and Tutsi are 
political identities.107 If a person’s inclusion in the state and their rights are dependent on 
their race or ethnicity, then their race or ethnicity is a central defining characteristic. In 
this way, race and ethnicity are also political identities. 
 Colonialism presents itself as a civilizing project, and with colonialism, civilizing 
means modernizing which means Westernizing. Tutsis, in line with the Hamitic 
hypothesis, were understood within this framework as more civilized, and the colonial 
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authorities cast them as more Westernized, which eventually led to them being 
considered more alien. The idea that the Tutsi were superior because they were alien, that 
there were racial differences between them and the local population, was a colonial 
implant. Belgians, Germans, and the English were convinced that wherever there was 
evidence of “civilized life,” the ruling groups could not have been indigenous. Scholars 
have largely disagreed on how best to categorize Hutu and Tutsi, but Mamdani argues 
that there is no single definition. Hutu and Tutsi, as primarily political identities, have 
shifted over the years just as state projects have. Yet across the colonial and postcolonial 
periods Tutsi and Hutu were set up as bipolar identities. The social degradation of the 
Hutu was partly to blame for this. The Tutsi identity often absorbed successful Hutu into 
their ranks. To be born Tutsi was to be either born into power or to be born power 
adjacent, whereas to be born Hutu became to be born more and more like a subjected 
underclass.  
By the end of the nineteenth century, the identities had clearly become divided 
along political lines. And so, in precolonial Rwanda, Hutu/Tutsi was subject/power 
oriented, and then the colonial state racialized the difference to be indigenous/alien. Also, 
while Hutu continued to be disproportionately present at the lower levels of society, there 
was a new (but small) amount of social mobility, which would be important in the 
postcolonial context. Colonialism took an already skewed power dynamic and made it 
resonant with colonial power and subjugation, rather than just local dynamics.108 This 
switch made the group relations more explosive than ever before. 
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On some level, racialization was an intellectual construct, with very little basis in 
reality. However, the colonial authorities made efforts to establish it as an institutional 
construct as well. The institutional racial privilege reproduced the racial ideology. This 
joint intellectual and institutional process was conducted by the colonial state and the 
Catholic Church.109 The Church, in 1902, hailed the Tutsi as “supreme humans,” and “a 
European under a black skin,” in 1917.110 The difference was primarily institutionalized 
through a series of administrative reforms from 1927 to 1936. Key institutions, such as 
education, state administration, taxation, and the Church, were organized around an 
acknowledgement of different Rwandan identities. The reform was clinched with a 
census that classified the entire population as Tutsi, Hutu or Twa (indigenous Rwandan 
minority), and then each person was issued an identification card proclaiming their 
official identities. These cards would later be used to filter Tutsi and execute them.  
The school system was a space in which the perpetuation of the racial ideology 
became a priority. The Western-style schools that opened in Rwanda were primarily 
administered by the Church—the objective was to turn the Tutsi into an elite population 
capable of being auxiliaries to the Church and the colonial administration. The schools 
tended to restrict education to mainly Tutsi, and when both Tutsi and Hutu were 
admitted, there was a very different education given to each. The Tutsi were given a 
superior education, usually in French, and this assimilationist approach prepared them for 
administrative positions, and more generally, for their citizenship. The Hutu were taught 
in Kiswahili and this underlined the fact that educated Hutu were not destined for 
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common citizenship. Tutsi supremacy was not only established in the colonial hierarchy, 
but also Christianized. Access to Church positions were restricted to the Tutsi elite, even 
while the evangelism was directed mainly at the Hutu peasantry. While schools pushed a 
racial ideology, state administration racialized local authorities. Again, the Church 
pushed for Tutsi supremacy in local administration. The reforms of the 1920s saw the 
Tutsification of the chiefship as an institution. Local Hutu chiefs were systematically 
deposed and replaced by Tutsi chiefs that had gone to schools for the sons of Tutsi chiefs. 
These new chiefs had been educated on the basis of Hamitic supremacy, and felt it was 
their birthright. Their chiefships were further strengthened by judicial reforms in 1936 
that further centralized their power. The judicial reforms meant that chiefs were often 
able to sit in judgement of themselves, effectively creating local despots. 
 Even though the Hutu peasantry was primarily involved in agriculture and the 
Belgian colonial government made a lot of agrarian reforms, the Hutu peasantry 
experienced a harsh Belgian rule. This was partly due to the aforementioned Tutsification 
of local authorities. Tutsi chiefs were able to simply appropriate the wages of their 
laborers, while those laborers were still responsible for paying their monetary taxes. The 
colonial administration also instituted arbitrary exactions that it mandated, and the 
punishments for reneging on these requirements (forced labor/crops), was getting hit 
repeatedly with a cane. Forced labor, particularly, was a key mode of exploitation. The 
colonial authorities would pass on every developmental requirement, like the upkeep of 
infrastructure, to chiefs, who would use their authority to force the Hutu peasantry to 
perform the task without payment. The regime of forced labor continued to expand— 
chiefs began to demand more and more days of forced and unpaid labor as a “land tax,” 
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and soon began to add requirements like the free construction of their houses. While the 
Tutsi were undoubtedly complicit in a multilayered system of Hutu oppression, the 
Belgians enforced the system. Tutsi authorities were often forced to whip the Hutu and 
force them to work, under the threat of getting whipped themselves. Even then, Tutsi 
chiefs had significant agency and were in a profitable partnership, able to exact additional 
resources from the Hutu to line their pockets. 
 All these measures depend on the classification of Hutu and Tutsi, and the 
Belgians achieved this rigid classification with the census of 1933. The criteria are widely 
debated—one measure was to categorize those with more than ten cows as Tutsi and 
those with less as Hutu. It is impossible that this was applied in every case, not only 
because it is mathematically improbable, but also because not all Tutsi owned more than 
ten cows. Mamdani argues that the ten cow rule was probably used more to identify 
Hutu, and not Tutsi.111 This meant that rich Hutu were, once again, somewhat absorbed 
into the ranks of the Tutsi. The administration also relied on the Church for demographic 
information, and the Church differentiated between Hutu and Tutsi based on physical 
measurement and ownership of a large herd of cows. The Church had the opportunity to 
institutionalize the Hamitic hypothesis and the Belgian administration the opportunity to 
take a real socioeconomic distinction and racialize it.  
 Once they became legal identities the past social rise from Hutu to Tutsi or fall 
from Tutsi to Hutu was no longer possible. For the first time, these categories became 
permanent identities. This system was upheld by a regime of Tutsi privilege. The 
administrative regime was Tutsi dominated. Poor Tutsi were exempt from the unfair 
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exaction regime, and rich Tutsi explicitly profited off it, cementing the idea that to be 
born Tutsi was to be associated with power. And so, in summary: Tutsi was first cast as 
an identity of power through the ennoblement of prosperous individuals through 
marriage. Then, colonial rule doubled down on the power/subject dynamic framed by the 
Hamitic hypothesis. The Belgian authorities and the Church racialized the divide, making 
it into a settler/native dynamic in which Tutsi were made to be a nonindigenous identity. 
The Legacy of the Victim/Perpetrator Cycle 
 
 In the post-colonial phase, the fortunes of the Tutsi changed. Because the Hutu 
and Tutsi had become synonymous with an indigenous majority and alien minority under 
colonial rule, the decolonization movement relied on the empowerment of the indigenous 
majority against the alien minority. The main causes of the 1959 Revolution had their 
roots in colonial changes. The Belgian move not only made the Tutsi a nonindigenous 
identity, it also definitively consolidated Tutsi privilege in a way that led Tutsi of all 
socioeconomic levels to absorb privilege. This meant that the Tutsi embraced their 
identity as nonindigenous—their position as nonindigenous Hamites was the foundation 
of their privileged positions. Even while colonial rule made the state apparatus 
increasingly rigid by reducing social mobility, its introduction of a monetized economy 
and school-based education eventually led to the creation of a Hutu elite. This meant that 
there was an educated elite that felt permanently trapped in a subordinate legal status and 
so developed into a powerful political counter elite, committed to the overthrow of the 
current social order. The Hutu counter elite was perfectly positioned to tap into the 
frustrations of the Hutu peasantry over local despotism and coerced labor.  
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 Hutu labor migrants, to escape coerced labor, often found themselves in the 
Congo and Uganda. Both destinations had new thriving postwar markets for minerals, 
coffee, and sugar.112 These migrants often experienced a new social order, leading them 
to the fresh realization that the Tutsi despotism in Rwanda was unjust. Many of the early 
protest leaders were former migrant workers, who now had economic security and a 
social network, making it easy to politically organize and mobilize. This, coupled with 
the rise of the school-based Western education system, led to the erosion of the social 
supremacy of the Tutsi, even though the political supremacy was left intact. The cattle 
based wealth of the Tutsi elite was still untouched, but the Belgians encouraged Hutus to 
grow crops for export, giving them access to the money economy via their cash crops, 
weakening the colonial bonds of pastoral servitude. In this context, education had a 
charged impact on the Hutu that were able to access it. The school system’s merit based 
system led to the foundation of egalitarian ideas. It was still, however, heavily based on 
the Hamitic hypothesis and the school system still operated by giving Tutsi access to a 
French education and Hutu access to the Kiswahili education. While very few Hutu 
managed to access secondary education, the ones that did were struck by the injustice of 
the political and economic monopoly of the Tutsi. Therefore, the push to break this 
monopoly became the central aim of the Hutu intellectual elite during the revolution. 
Former Hutu priests were also increasingly a part of the Hutu counter elite. While 
studying for the priesthood and attempting to climb the Church hierarchy, the Tutsi 
monopoly on the Church was abundantly clear. Even though the Church laid the 
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foundations of the Hamitic hypothesis, Christian ideology espoused egalitarianism and 
became a powerful motivator for Hutu priests. 
 The 1961 elections were the context in which the Hutu counter elite created a 
popular nationalism from below that clashed with the Tutsi nationalism from above. Both 
decried the “racial tension” at the core of their problems—one focused on the foreign 
black versus white dynamic and one on the local Hamite versus Bantu (Hutu) dynamic.113 
This caused the Hutu counter elite to articulate their hostility against the Hutu elite. The 
clash signaled a contrast 
between Tutsi power and 
Hutu lack of power, and the 
characterization of Tutsi 
power as foreign. The 
confluence of a popular 
movement of frustrated Hutu 
peasants and the emergence 
of a Hutu counter elite 
created a moment in which 
the Hutu could overcome their identity as subordinate and seize power. And so, became 
the rallying cry: Hutu Power! 
 The assertiveness of the Hutu Power movement only led to a distressed and 
outraged push back from the Tutsi, who had been fed a steady diet of the Hamitic 
hypothesis and Tutsi supremacy. They were committed to defending colonial privilege 
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Figure 14: Hutus living in this house scrawled their ethnicity on the 
wall to prevent looting. They fled to escape the advance of the rebel 
forces. 
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and equating it with custom and privilege. This reaction only strengthened the Hutu 
political cause. The claim that Tutsi power needed to be restored only further 
strengthened the Hutu movement while discrediting the Tutsi one. The growing Hutu 
counter elite brought Tutsi unity under pressure and expanded the political arena, 
eventually bringing around two rival political parties: Union Nationale Rwandaise 
(UNAR), conservative, and Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais (RADER), 
reformist, in competition with the conservative Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation 
Hutu, PARMEHUTU, and the moderate Association Pour la Promotion Sociale de la 
Masse (APROMOSA). These were the limited choices that the Rwandan people faced 
before the election.  
 The elections were marked with UNAR/PARMEHUTU militant clashes and 
revolts throughout the country. The focus of the revolts were Tutsi chiefs who were killed 
or forced to resign. The visiting UN Mission estimated the dead at over 200 people and 
Belgium placed Rwanda in a state of emergency at the concern that Tutsi chiefs might 
begin full scale Hutu repression. Before the violence could swing from anti-Tutsi to anti-
Hutu, emergency military action by Belgium intervened with the command of Colonel 
B.E.M. Guy Logiest. Arguing that Tutsi chiefs were threatening the public order, he 
began to replace them with Hutu chiefs, and so began the overthrow against the colonial 
power’s own local authorities. The state hierarchy suddenly became a Hutu hierarchy. 
There was significant external influence in this “revolution.” European clergy acted as a 
backup force for the Hutu counter elite, writing manifestos and UN petitions.114  The 
colonial government handed over power to the insurgent force. And this support was 
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critical, without the significant external support, it is not clear that the Hutu counter elite 
would have been able to stage a revolution.  
 With their political power significantly reversed, the Tutsi elite splintered, some 
went into political exile, some stayed home. The few left began to try to push for power 
again, but the Hutu political elite was determined that the new political community 
exclude Tutsi. Many believe that the beginning of the genocidal tendencies of 1994 began 
in 1959. While the revolution was a bloodbath, the attempted repression that followed, 
politically, gave the upper hand to the Hutu power tendency. After the revolution, the 
Hutu claimed that the government represented the whole nation. But of course, in a 
primarily Hutu government, the nation represented was also Hutu, which meant that the 
Tutsi were disenfranchised civically. The Tutsi were removed from the political arena, 
although they continued to be present in business, education, and the Church, because 
they were alien. In the view of the new era, the Tutsi were not only alien, but they were 
also a minority, meaning that representation for them did not matter. In addition to just 
being a minority, they were a historically privileged minority—which meant that justice 
in a Hutu nation looked like fixing Tutsi dominated institutions like the Church, 
education, and employment to be Hutu spheres of power. The Second Republic failed to 
integrate, or even try to integrate, the Tutsi diaspora into the postcolonial reality. This 
integration would assume that the Tutsi were as much a part of the political community 
as the Hutu. 
 This cycle of victims becoming perpetrators happened again with the civil war 
and the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s invasion in October 1990. The RPF went in as an army 
looking to liberate a people and came out of it as an army of occupation. The 
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Habyarimana regime entered the 
war pledged to ethnic 
reconciliation, but exited the war 
pledged to uphold Hutu Power. 
As Hutu Power was threatened 
with the RPF invasion, a 
genocidal tendency was born in 
its defense. For the first time in 
decades, the danger of Tutsi 
Power was back, thanks to the RPF invasion. This was, at least, how the Rwandan 
government explained the invasion to the Rwandan population and foreign media. They 
were once again at risk of being oppressed, and so returned Hutu Power to the forefront 
of politics. The threat of Tutsi Power led to a string of massacres and random killing and 
pillaging of Tutsis. The enemy was initially just the political enemy that was the Tutsi, 
but soon Hutu who were branded accomplices of the RPF were also targeted. In this 
explosive situation, we also must remember that the war disrupted agricultural production 
and the economy as a whole. This, in addition to the Arusha Accords115, resulted in a 
completely polarized situation. The UN mandated that the government must implement 
the Arusha Agreement, or it would be forced to pull out, isolating the Kigali government.  
 It was in this context that Habyarima’s plane was shot down. The murder of their 
president seemed like a sign that without Hutu Power, there would only be Hutu 
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Figure 15: A Hutu man whose face was mutilated by the Hutu 
Interahamwe militia, who suspected him of sympathizing with 
the Tutsi rebels. 
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servitude. And so, it became the time for Hutu to choose between power and servitude. 
President Habyarima and his prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, represented the 
middle ground of ethnic reconciliation, even as they supported Hutu Power, which had 
served to obstruct those with genocidal tendencies. The genocidal tendency now had free 
reign, beginning yet another cycle of victims turned perpetrators. 
Current Relevance: Gacaca As the Key to Reconciliation 
 
 To break the cycle, historical memory becomes key. The genocide claimed more 
than half a million lives and murdered approximately three quarters of Rwanda’s Tutsi 
population in just three months. Also, as many as 250,000 women were raped, leaving the 
country’s population traumatized and its infrastructure decimated. In this context, any 
form of justice post-genocide seemed near impossible. But justice is what was needed to 
create reconciliation between two polarized groups. Rwanda lacked not only the 
infrastructure to take on the massive commitment of prosecuting the murderers, but also 
lacked the lawyers and judges, as they had either been killed or fled the country. And, 
given the popular nature of the genocide, there were a lot of people to prosecute. Rwanda 
presents an interesting case study, especially in the context of this thesis, because the 
state took a very active role in creating a legacy and reconciliation. While it was far from 
perfect, it was extraordinary given the circumstances.  
 The main concept that is important to post-genocide justice in Rwanda is 
transitional justice. Transitional justice is rooted in accountability. By putting victims and 
their dignity first, it signals the way forward for a renewed commitment to make sure 
ordinary citizens are safe in their own countries. Mass atrocities and systematic abuses 
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devastate societies and their legacy is likely to make conditions of the country fragile: 
political and legal institutions are weak, unstable, politicized, and under-resourced.116 
However, while justice was an important commitment, Rwanda also had to find a way to 
move forward as a united nation. Because of the unprecedented scale of civilian-on-
civilian violence that had occurred, there were far more people implicated in crimes than 
could be prosecuted officially. 
Rwanda found a way to focus on both reconciliation and justice. Justice was 
pursued in the way of gacaca courts, and through the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda117 and extradition. Justice in Rwanda was a highly controversial process, as was 
inevitable considering the task the government was given.118 The new government, 
headed by the RPF, adopted a stance of maximal prosecution. Each participant in the 
genocide was to be prosecuted.119  This included the central planners, the coerced civilian 
population, and those who were opportunistic throughout the process. They would all be 
prosecuted and punished for their crimes. Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide outlined five acts that constituted genocidal 
acts: (1) killing members of the group; (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; (3) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (4) imposing 
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measures intended to prevent births within the group; (5) forcibly transferring children of 
the group to another group.120 The Rwandan genocide code of 1996 outlined four 
categories of responsibility in the genocide: (1) “planners, organizers, instigators, 
supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or of a crime against humanity,” persons 
in positions of authority in the government or political parties, “notorious murderers,” 
and “persons who committed acts of sexual torture”; (2) perpetrators or “conspirators of 
accomplices” of intentional homicide or physical assault causing death; (3) persons guilty 
of “serious assaults against the person”; and (4) persons who committed crimes against 
property.121 
On an international level, the UN Security Council created the ICTR. Its mandate 
was to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed between January 1, 1994, and December 31, 
1994, in Rwanda or in neighboring states. The ICTR was expected to enable the 
prosecution of the genocide planners who had fled the country, acknowledge the 
international scope of the crimes committed in Rwanda, establish a significant repository 
of testimony and evidence about the 1994 genocide, and help seek justice for genocide 
survivors. The ICTR lived up to these expectations to some degree but was not an 
unquestionable success. Many Rwandans felt marginalized by the ICTR in the beginning 
because they were not able to access information about the proceedings. However, by the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, Rwandans were able to follow the trials due to public 
information campaigns. They largely followed the high profile trials, such as trials in 
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which owners of the extremist, anti-Tutsi propaganda newspapers and radio were 
prosecuted, and the military trials, in which several highly placed officers were 
prosecuted. Many Rwandans view the institution as unjust since people prosecuted before 
the ICTR face lesser penalties than those tried inside Rwanda and enjoy comparatively 
luxurious prison conditions. In addition, the vast resources invested in the ICTR and its 
slow progress encouraged additional criticism, and the Rwandan government did, when 
politically expedient, encourage negative sentiment toward the ICTR.122 
Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, several foreign governments were 
involved in prosecuting Rwandans for genocide-related crimes.123 One of the important 
examples was the trial of a National University of Rwanda professor and four Roman 
Catholic nuns in Belgium in 2001.124 According to Human Rights Watch, the defendants 
were charged with violations of humanitarian law under the Geneva Conventions and the 
Belgian penal code. All were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment. The second 
trial was in Canada. Canada prosecuted Desiré Munyaneza under the domestic Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, passed in 2000.125 Munyaneza was the son of a 
wealthy Hutu shopkeeper in Butare and fled to Canada in around 1996. In 2005, he was 
arrested and charged with genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. His trial 
began in March 2007 and lasted over two years and cost the Canadian government 
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millions of dollars.126 On the 29th of October 2009, he was sentenced to life in prison 
with no chance of parole for at least 25 years. Prosecutions of other genocide suspects 
continued before several European courts and the Rwandan government investigated 
suspects who fled and began living abroad to request their extradition. 
On a national level, the first genocide trials began in Rwanda’s Belgian-style 
courts in December of 1996. The Rwandan justice system was destroyed in the genocide 
and its personnel, including lawyers and judges killed, was overwhelmed and trials 
moved forward at an extremely slow pace. As of March 2001, the national courts had 
tried around 5,310 people.127 In the late 1990s, prison and local jail populations in 
Rwanda soared to over 130,000,128 almost all prisoners were held on charges of genocide. 
Any country would have struggled under the problem of trying to organize fair trials for 
that many genocide suspects. Under pressure from the international community to solve 
the problem, the Rwandan government turned to gacaca. 
Gacaca courts have been framed as local justice, transitional justice, and 
reconciliation. Gacaca’s role in the reconciliation process is controversial, but the 
Rwandan government additionally pursued other means of reconciliation. The 
reconciliation process in Rwanda focused on reconstructing the Rwandan identity, as well 
as balancing justice, truth, peace, and security.129 The Constitution now states that every 
Rwandan share equal rights with their fellow countrymen. Laws have been passed to 
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fight discrimination and divisive genocide ideology. The Rwandan government 
established the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) in 1999 and has 
contributed substantially to reconciliation efforts in Rwanda. The NURC has organized 
many conferences that aim to help people understand the roots of genocide, and how to 
proceed with life in the aftermath of genocide. The NURC also organizes conferences to 
bring people together to share their grievances. It was in these settings that the 
government realized that making education free up till high school and abolishing official 
discrimination were crucial steps to take. 
It is important to understand what the main aims of transitional justice were. 
Some scholars argue that there were six main aims: truth, justice, peace, healing, 
forgiveness, and reconciliation.130 The question of the success of transitional justice lies 
in how well gacaca courts did on these six counts. Furthermore, gacaca was tasked with 
processing the massive backlog of genocide cases, improving living conditions in the 
jails, and facilitating economic development. Although, to be clear, the government of 
Rwanda did not choose gacaca courts because they felt that it was the most efficient 
mechanism to realize their objectives, but because there was a dearth of good options 
from which to choose. 
The government believed that gacaca would overcome future minor conflicts and 
create a sense of unity.131 A lot of the government’s faith in gacaca’s ability to build 
peace assumed that there would be future conflicts. The government expected gacaca to 
create civic virtues in the population that would not only allow them to deal with the 
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conflicts of the past, but also encourage peaceful deliberation in the future. The 
population was divided on how to interpret the role of gacaca in the peacebuilding 
process. Peace was difficult to discuss when the wounds of the civil war were so fresh, 
and when there was such intense and deep rooted animosity. Relations between survivors 
and convicted criminals or suspects were often strained. Gacaca suspects often 
emphasized that gacaca helped to create negative peace, because they feared that they 
would be the victims of violent reprisals when they returned to their communities.132 
These suspects believed that without gacaca giving them the opportunity to express 
remorse for their crimes and ask for forgiveness, their communities would act against 
them. However, research indicates that only a minority of suspects showed remorse for 
their crimes or asked for forgiveness.133 Survivors tended to interpret gacaca as 
contributing to positive peace, by creating a difficult but necessary dialogue. However, 
many members of the community also believed that gacaca exacerbated conflicts within 
the community by raising tensions. The NURC surveyed the public about gacaca and the 
results showed that most Rwandans expected an initial increase in instability during 
hearings. According to this survey, 49 percent of the general population and 74 percent of 
survivors believed that gacaca testimonies exacerbated tensions amongst families.134 
However, the consensus amongst the population seems to be that, beyond initial 
confrontation, gacaca did contribute to positive peace. Arguably, the initial tensions 
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added to the peacebuilding process because they directed tensions into engagement at the 
courts.  
Healing differs from reconciliation in the sense that it refers more to an 
individual’s post-genocide trauma than to a communal healing. One way in which gacaca 
contributed to healing was by freeing many survivors of certain sources of mental 
anguish, such as not knowing what happened to their loved ones during the genocide. 
Some survivors also articulated that they felt more whole because they felt more 
connected to their community after gacaca. The processes in the gacaca that affected 
individuals overlaps with the processes that helped determine the truth after the genocide. 
Survivors and suspects often found personal redemption through the truth. Gacaca allows 
survivors to use storytelling as a mechanism to reintegrate themselves into their 
community.135 They were able to externalize their trauma in front of an empathetic 
audience and hear similar stories and overcome feelings of social isolation. 
Memorialization is extremely important for survivors because they often did not get to 
bury their loved ones. However, not all survivors believed that gacaca contributed to 
healing. The same NURC survey as quoted above showed that 91 percent of survivors 
believed that gacaca would intensify suffering and trauma.136  
Suspects often expressed that they, like survivors, were looking to find peace of 
mind from gacaca. Perhaps more so than survivors, suspects express that gacaca is a 
necessary step to redeem themselves to reenter society. Those who confessed to 
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committing crimes expressed that gacaca acted as a process of redemption and atonement 
for them, and those who believe they were innocent only felt at peace when they were 
able to refute the allegations made against them in court. Academic commenters and 
NGO workers were critical of healing within gacaca as they believed that it did not 
contribute to the healing process sufficiently. Many believed that counselling sessions 
and workshops were necessary for survivors to work through their trauma, and that the 
open-air style of gacaca would aggravate trauma and a feeling of vulnerability and 
isolation. Additionally, while gacaca may begin the process of healing, it is a long 
process and all participants require ongoing assistance. Many participants believed that it 
is the community engagement that gacaca provides that is most valuable in their healing 
process.  
The concept of forgiveness is a relatively new one in transitional justice, and a 
very controversial one. Many critics have argued that including forgiveness in the 
discussion surrounding transitional justice pushes transitional justice further from 
retributive and deterrent justice.137 They believe that forgiveness entails a contrived 
forgetting of crimes on the part of victims and relinquishes the principles of 
accountability and redress for victims that are so core to transitional justice. However, 
Hannah Arendt has argued that forgiveness is a key process for post atrocity justice 
because it is the exact opposite of revenge. She believes that vengeance only fuels the 
cycle of violence.138  Forgiveness in transitional justice does not refer to ignoring the 
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crimes committed or intending to forget them, but rather, actively acknowledging them. 
Forgiveness does not close off the possibility that someone might seek redress. This is 
also where forgiveness differs from reconciliation, because while forgiveness suggests 
there would be a new relationship between the perpetrator and the survivor, nothing in 
the concept of forgiveness suggests that the two parties must reconcile. There are three 
main ways to explore forgiveness: what form forgiveness should take; by what processes 
it occurs through gacaca; and what motivates survivors to forgive. 
Survivors were more hesitant about accepting the concept of forgiveness than 
suspects. As explained earlier, many suspects believe gacaca helped them redeem 
themselves and atone for their crimes. It was largely the suspects who believe that 
forgiveness is possible after the genocide. A minority of survivors agree, but the vast 
majority believe that they will never be able to forgive perpetrators. Some survivors agree 
that forgiveness is necessary, but believe that it is not a priority, compared with other 
concerns such as the truth. Forgiveness as a process is typically separated into categories 
of interpersonal, forgetting, and forgiveness from God.139 Interpersonal includes 
individual to individual, and individual to group, in which suspects ask their community 
for forgiveness. The processes through which forgiveness takes place is typically during 
gacaca hearings. The process is a two way interaction which requires the active 
involvement of the survivor and the suspect. It involves the suspect confessing, 
apologizing and then requesting forgiveness. The survivor decides whether to forgive 
them based on the level of remorse and regret expressed. The emphasis on forgiveness 
 
139Clark, The Gacaca Courts, 26. 
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often simply means survivors accept the contrition of perpetrators and decide not to 
pursue any revenge or retribution against them. Academics have pointed out that there 
was a lot of discussion 
about how survivors have a 
right to retribution, based on 
the trauma they have 
endured.140 Forgiveness 
means survivors allow 
perpetrators to rejoin their 
communities. However, like 
healing, it is clear that the 
process of forgiveness may begin at gacaca, but it is a long process that requires 
continued dialogue.  
The pursuit of truth in a post-conflict society is often framed as one that sacrifices 
the pursuit of justice. Policy makers often must decide between establishing a judicial 
institution that tries an individual without full knowledge of the truth, or some form of 
truth commission, which involves the promise of amnesty for the full disclosure of the 
truth. Scholars typically separate “legal truth” and “therapeutic truth,” when discussing 
post-conflict societies because some testimonies are given for a personal or emotional 
reason, rather than to achieve a pragmatic objective. Academics also set apart three 
processes through which the truth is found: truth telling, truth hearing, and truth 
 
140Clark, The Gacaca Courts, 43. 
Credit: Marco Longari/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images 
Figure 16: A Rwandan confronting an inmate in a session for detainees 
who were accused of crimes committed during the genocide. 
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shaping.141 Truth telling is the process through which participants detail their personal 
experiences. Truth hearing is the process by which participants internalize and react to 
that truth. Truth shaping is the process by which external parties interpret and repeat the 
testimony to achieve a secondary function. Some Rwandan commenters believe that the 
truth telling process was critical for people to confront the ethnic hatreds that led to the 
genocide. Non-Rwandan commenters usually strongly disagree that the truth telling 
process had any merits and argue that the truth telling at gacaca was primarily a ‘top-
down’ process, by which the government imposed a series of legal and historical truths 
upon an unwilling population to encourage punitiveness against the Hutu; and second, 
that public testimony opposes a pervasive Rwandan culture of silence and secrecy and 
thus violates embedded social norms.142 Furthermore, while most commenters and 
academics agree that gacaca facilitated the pursuit of truth far more than any other 
institution could have, there are many flaws with the system. One is that, since there was 
such a demand for the truth and such a focus on confessions as a path to forgiveness, a 
great deal of suspects confessed to crimes less severe than they committed. Some 
communities have organized and abide by a code of silence before the gacaca courts. 
Because of this, many survivors believed that truth would not be restored to them by 
gacaca. The accused and their families were also distrustful of the gacaca process. They 
believed that the testimonies would be used for something other than to serve justice for 
the genocide. This was not an unfounded concern. In some communities, genocide 
 
141 Clark, The Gacaca Courts, 188. 
142Bert Ingelaere, “‘Does the Truth Pass across the Fire without Burning?’ Locating the Short 
Circuit in Rwanda's Gacaca Courts.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 47, no. 04, Dec. 
2009, p. 507., doi:10.1017/s0022278x0999005x. 
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survivors conspired to fabricate testimony against certain people. This was often 
motivated by a desire for revenge, in which they felt sure that certain people were 
involved and wanted to make sure they were punished, or to settle financial or land 
related disputes. These cases were problematic because they went against Gacaca Law, 
but it was very difficult to tell who was lying.143 
Gacaca is generally said to have been successful at achieving a fair degree of 
justice in the communities affected. This is typically a form of restorative justice. While 
gacaca was largely successful in terms of addressing the genocide and the crimes 
committed, to the greatest extent that it was able to, Hutus were largely mistreated. There 
are three ways in which the gacaca courts failed to deliver justice: no accountability for 
RPF crimes, unfair trials, and inhumane treatment in prisons. Gacaca is often viewed as 
the victor's justice. The Gacaca Law states that gacaca only has jurisdiction over crimes 
related to the genocide, and therefore atrocities committed by the RPF were largely 
ignored. Several sources described indiscriminate killings by RPF soldiers, and summary 
executions of those suspected to have taken part in the genocide. This violates the 
UDHR’s articles 10 and 11, the right to a fair trial and the right to be perceived as 
innocent until proven guilty. The RPF carried out tens of thousands of killings, and 
mostly without evidence. They believed that they were killing those responsible for the 
genocide, but it is clear that most of the Hutus that played a large part in organizing the 
 
143 Article 10 of the 2004 Gacaca Law provides that judges cannot decide cases in which a 
“serious enmity” exists with the accused or where “any other relation [is] considered incompatible 
with the honest person’s independence.” 
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genocide had already fled by then. The RPF was largely murdering civilians who had 
been coerced or forced into the killings.  
Gacaca also had several basic violations of the right to a fair trial.144 The UDHR 
explains the right to a fair trial in Article 10, “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair 
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his 
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”145 Some of the 
shortcomings of gacaca in terms of ensuring a fair trial include: limitations on an accused 
person's ability to effectively defend themselves; flawed decision-making leading to 
allegations of miscarriages of justice; cases based on what appeared to be trumped-up 
charges, linked, in some cases, to the government’s wish to silence critics or to settle 
disputes between neighbors and even relatives; judges’ or officials’ intimidation of 
defense witnesses; corruption of judges to obtain the desired verdict; and other serious 
procedural irregularities.146 Gacaca proceedings do not follow these laws and the accused 
have no right to counsel at any point through the proceedings. The government has 
strongly defended its decision by saying that the number of accused made counsel for all 
impossible, lawyers would bias untrained judges and the community-based system was 
enough to guarantee a fair trial. However, this was untrue—based on previous paragraphs 
which discussed the prevalence of lying in these courts. The government also could have 
guaranteed alternative forms of legal assistance to ensure a fair trial. There was 
 
144 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” United Nations, United Nations, 
www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. (Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair 
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge against him.) 
145“Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” United Nations. 
146Dennis B Klein, Societies Emerging from Conflict: the Aftermath of Atrocity (Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2017) 100 and Rwandan Constitution, art. 18, articles 64 and 96; Genocide 
Law, art. 36. See also ICCPR, art. 14; ACHPR, art. 7. 
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significant international support for this notion, but the Rwandan government did not act. 
Additionally, the fundamental right of innocence until proven guilty was not always 
respected during gacaca proceedings.147 Furthermore, the UN Human Rights Committee 
states that public bodies should not prejudge outcomes of trials.148 This was largely 
ignored by the Rwandan government, that constantly announced names of people they 
believed to be guilty over the radio before their trial results were announced. Also, 
government officials often used accusations of “revisionism,” “negationism,” and “gross 
minimization of genocide,” all of which are proscribed by the Rwandan Constitution and 
a 2003 law punishing genocide—as tools to suppress independent opinion and criticism 
and pursue political opponents.149 This often occurred in high profile cases, especially 
when those involved were government critics. This created an environment that biased 
the results of the trial.  
Fair trial rights of an accused include the right to be informed of the accusations 
against him or her and the right to have sufficient time to prepare a defense.150 In gacaca 
cases many of those accused learned the nature of the allegations against them during the 
trial. They did not receive the legally prescribed notice or were not given enough 
information about the charges pending against them to prepare an adequate defense. 
Furthermore, the gacaca jurisdiction must deliver a formal summons to any person asked 
 
147 Rwandan Constitution, art. 19; Rwandan Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 44; ICCPR, art. 14; 
ACHPR, art. 7.  
148 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.32, Article 14: Right to equality for courts 
and tribunals and to a fair trial.  
149“Justice Compromised | The Legacy of Rwanda's Community-Based Gacaca Courts.” Human 
Rights Watch, 19 Oct. 2015, www.hrw.org/report/2011/05/31/justice-compromised/legacy-
rwandas-community-based-gacaca-courts#page. 
150 Rwandan Constitution, art. 18; Rwandan Criminal Procedure Code, arts 64, 127-28; ICCPR, 
art. 14. The right to a defense is also declared in Article 7 of the ACHPR.  
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to appear at a trial.151 Human Rights Watch documented many cases in which summonses 
were delivered less than seven days before the hearing, which prejudiced the ability of 
the accused to prepare a defense.152 Summons were given late, or not delivered at all. 
Sometimes, those accused had no idea that they had a case pending against them, and in 
other instances they did not know the date of the trial and so were declared guilty by 
default. Often, they did not have adequate information about the charges against the 
accused and so the accused were not able to prepare a defense. In response to this, the 
accused often asked for trials to be postponed so they could gather documents and 
prepare their defense and were denied. If a defense was prepared, they were often not 
allowed to present one. The right to present a defense is implied in Rwandan law and 
exists in international law.153 Witnesses were sometimes intimidated and prevented from 
showing up. Gacaca courts also sometimes did not allow the accused to confront or 
interact with witnesses that were accusing them of crimes.  
The ICCPR guarantees an accused the right “not to be compelled to testify against 
himself or to confess guilt.”154 The 2004 Gacaca Law does not guarantee this right, and 
its preamble states that all Rwandans have a legal duty to testify.155 Article 29 goes on to 
say that “[a]ny person who omits or refuses to testify on what he/she has seen or on what 
he/she knows, as well as the one who makes a slanderous denunciation, shall be 
prosecuted by the Gacaca Court which makes the statement of it.” In this case, Gacaca 
 
151 2004 Gacaca Law, art. 82.  
152 “Justice Compromised” Human Rights Watch. 
153 Code of Criminal Procedure, arts. 54-63, 144, 146, 180, 205;  ICCPR, art. 14; ACHPR, art. 7.  
154  ICCPR, Article 14 (3)(g). This right is not guaranteed by the ACHPR.  
155 2004 Gacaca Law, preamble. 
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Law directly conflicts with international law. This is one of the conflicts between truth 
and justice. A body only committed to justice would not force participants to testify, but 
gacaca must balance the obligations of both. In addition, the UN Human Rights 
Committee has emphasized the right to be present at one’s own trial.156 Rwanda allowed 
trials in absentia.157 These trials are not necessarily illegal. They are only problematic 
within the context that gacaca trials have failed to protect so many other basic human 
rights. Many of these trials have been politically motivated and designed to ensure that 
the accused are not present and so unable to defend themselves. Furthermore, Rwandan, 
and international law guarantees the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained.158 
Immediately following the genocide, tens of thousands of individuals were arrested on 
the basis of unconfirmed accusations and detained for prolonged periods without any 
form of due process. By 1998, the prison population reached around 130,000, with 
detainees held in life-threatening conditions. This is also inhumane and degrading 
treatment, which is illegal under many sources international law.159 Furthermore, gacaca 
judges were not trained or qualified, and so their ability to carry out a fair trial vastly 
differs from judges in formal legal institutions.  
The ability of gacaca to administer justice can largely be assessed based on the 
principle of a right to remedy.160 This states that: “Everyone has the right to an effective 
 
156Human Rights Committee General Comments, art. 14, para. 11, 
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/bb722416a295f264c12563ed0049dfbd (accessed August 31, 
2010). Article 14: “When exceptionally for justified reasons trials in absentia are held, strict 
observance of the rights of the defence is all the more necessary.” 
157 Rwandan Code of Criminal Procedure, arts. 155-156.  
158 Rwandan Constitution, art. 18; ICCPR, art. 9; ACHPR, art. 5.  
159 ICCPR Article 7, 10 and The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
160 UDHR Article 8. 
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remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights 
granted him by the constitution or by law.” Gacaca certainly, to a great extent, allowed 
Tutsi participants to find justice. Of course, this varied from community to community, 
but by in large, Tutsi participants were positively affected by gacaca. The same cannot be 
said for Hutu participants. Unfortunately, gacaca was never built to find justice for its 
Hutu participants, and so by its own aims, succeeded in providing justice. However, by 
an international standard, the gacaca courts largely failed in terms of providing a right to 
effective remedy.  
Reconciliation was interpreted by the Rwandan population in an individualistic 
fashion. The population articulated that reconciliation was about emotional and personal 
issues. It was largely face to face interactions, and gacaca facilitated this type of 
interaction. Furthermore, the earlier discussion of peace, healing and forgiveness all 
contribute to the concept of reconciliation. Personal healing and forgiveness between 
individuals contribute to a larger culture of reconciliation in Rwanda. Furthermore, 
gacaca punishments largely had the accused working in communities and working 
alongside survivors to build trust. This is a long process and could have only been started 
by gacaca courts.  
The gacaca court system was successful in its pragmatic aims, processing the 
massive backlog of genocide cases, improving living conditions in the jails, and 
facilitating economic development. In terms of its six objectives of peace, healing, 
forgiveness, truth, justice, and reconciliation, gacaca failed to protect several basic rights 
along the way. The RPF can be held accountable for the violations of these rights because 
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it seemed that they could have been easily protected if it were politically advantageous to 
do so. The Gacaca Law mandate should have included crimes committed against the 
Hutu population to better facilitate justice and reconciliation. Furthermore, the RPF led 
government should have ensured that there were supplementary programs in place to 
facilitate healing and justice more effectively.  
But even with these shortcomings, the Rwandan government, by so actively 
pursuing the justice process, regardless of ulterior motives, in many ways broke the cycle 
of the victim/perpetrator. While Hutus should have been treated significantly better after 
the genocide, they were largely integrated back into their communities, except for those 
facing trial abroad. Had the RPF chosen to take military action against the Hutu, and 
follow a campaign of oppression, the legacy that formed would have been the one to 
always exist: victim turned perpetrators when politically expedient.  
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Conclusion: The Thematic Approach as It Relates to US Mass Shootings 
 
"Memory, stay faithful to this moment, which will never return." 
Suji Kwock Kim 
 
Disenfranchisement, Power Threat Theory, Political Elite Influence and “America 
As Enemy” in The Context of Mass Shootings 
 
 Exploring the historical context of incidences of collective violence may allow us 
to prevent similar political crises and violence from breaking out in those regions, but the 
frameworks adopted here can also be applied more widely to other forms of collective 
violence. Because this approach does not take ethnicity or race to be the primary drivers 
of violence, it can be applied to many forms of violence that do not have a clear driver or 
do not isolate victims based on a specific identity group. For example, mass shootings in 
the US do not on the surface have many similarities to the case studies explored in the 
thesis. Mass shootings are not united by an ethnic or racial target, and unlike the case 
studies analyzed, are not conducted by a specific group, but rather by an individual acting 
on behalf of a group. The discourse around US mass shootings often point to the easy 
accessibility to guns as a primary motivator of mass shootings. However, this chapter’s 
analysis seeks to explain the cultural issues that lead to mass shootings, although the 
mass shooting rate is undoubtedly exacerbated by poor gun control. 
 The first framework, power/threat theory, applies well to mass shootings in the 
political and personal sense. The mass shooters often feel disenfranchised and on the 
fringes of society. The Violence Project developed a database of mass shooters and their 
life histories through interviews and social media and discovered that a vast majority of 
mass shooters experience childhood trauma, mental illness and then reach a crisis 
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point.161 The childhood trauma was often a precursor to mental illnesses such as 
depression, anxiety, thought disorders or suicidality. Most shooters then reached a clear 
crisis point before the shooting – for workplace shooters it was often a change in job 
status, and for other shooters it was often personal rejection or change in a relationship 
status. These men clearly felt isolated and dejected. Politically, many shooters’ 
manifestos speak to the “great replacement” or “white genocide” theory. The great 
replacement theory was first coined by the French writer Renaud Camus.162 The concern 
is that one people would be replaced by another. According to Camus, the identity of the 
new group is less important than the process of replacement. This idea of ‘replacement’ is 
similar to the power/threat framework: the concern that a marginalized population is 
gaining relative to and at the cost of the more powerful group. White mass shooters, like 
white Tulsans, worry that their position as part of a hegemonic power structure is under 
threat. Mass shooters obviously do not credit Camus with the idea, but his term has taken 
on a life of its own in the international white nationalist discourse. Of course, mass 
shooters rarely defend their ideas as in terms of a desire that their group maintain its 
hegemonic status. They talk about their whiteness as another type of diversity that must 
be protected – their racist ideology hidden within language of the progressive left.  
 
161“Mass Shooting Statistics Data,” The Violence Project, accessed May 10, 2020, 
https://www.theviolenceproject.org/methodology/. This database follows the Congressional 
Research Service definition: “a multiple homicide incident in which four or more victims are 
murdered with firearms—not including the offender(s)—within one event, and at least some of the 
murders occurred in a public location or locations in close geographical proximity (e.g., a 
workplace, school, restaurant, or other public settings), and the murders are not attributable to 
any other underlying criminal activity or commonplace circumstance (armed robbery, criminal 
competition, insurance fraud, argument, or romantic triangle).” 
162Lauretta Charlton, “What Is the Great Replacement?,” The New York Times, August 6, 2019, 
sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/us/politics/grand-replacement-explainer.html. 
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 The El Paso shooter’s manifesto disparages both Republicans and Democrats.163 
The manifesto attacks Democrats for the growing Hispanic population and for facilitating 
the great replacement. The author also worried that automation would limit job 
opportunities and believes that immigrants should not be allowed to enter the US while 
job opportunities are unstable. He criticizes Republicans for allowing corporate interests 
to control the government and worries that corporations are destroying the planet with 
their greed. The author clearly feels disenfranchised and voiceless in the political climate 
and sees threats on every side.164 Many manifestos contain a similar language: they talk 
about ethnic replacement, obsess over white birth rates and a “Hispanic invasion” at the 
southern border.165 These manifestos do not say as much about the individual shooters as 
they do about the culture that created them. In a climate in which white men feel 
disenfranchised and under threat of extinction, violence seems to be the only route by 
which to make an impact, and rhetoric from political elites emboldens them. 
 The ideologies mentioned in these manifestos are not new, but they have become 
mainstream ideas rather than a fringe ideology. Trump’s administration has given a 
platform to anti-immigrant ideas and created a social and political environment in which 
ideas of white nationalism has institutional backing. Trump provides a platform to the 
more extreme of the ideas, with comments like “You had some very bad people in that 
group. But you also had people that were very fine people, on both sides,” when asked 
about the presence of KKK and Nazi symbols in the Charlottesville riots, however, many 
 
163Tim Arango, Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, and Katie Benner, “Minutes Before El Paso Killing, 
Hate-Filled Manifesto Appears Online,” The New York Times, August 3, 2019, sec. U.S., 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/us/patrick-crusius-el-paso-shooter-manifesto.html. 
164 Ibid. 
165“Understanding The Statements Of Mass Shooters,” NPR.org, accessed May 10, 2020, 
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/07/748972024/understanding-the-statements-of-mass-shooters. 
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of these ideas pervade intellectual circles as well.166 Concerns about the future of white 
America can be found in the pages of the New York times and in best-selling books. 
Charles Murray talks about how the new white ‘lower class’ is increasingly 
disenfranchised and disillusioned.167 J.D. Vance explains the resurgence of outsider 
politics and the fears of the white underclass in Hillbilly Elegy.168  
 Even though the shooters seem to act alone, they are very much a part of a 
collective. In the 1980s and 1990s, before the internet solidified the movement, labels of 
‘lone wolf’ made sense. Now, these far-right movements share ideas, leadership, and 
inspirations across new internet platforms.169 The manifestos clearly suggest that they are 
playing off each other. The El Paso shooter referenced the New Zealand shooter. The 
Poway synagogue shooter drew inspiration from the New Zealand shooter and the 
Pittsburgh synagogue shooter.170 A few decades ago, individuals were empowered to act 
on their own since there was not a centralized movement – but now, the internet has 
created a virtual world that gives the threat of a “transnational, global white-supremacist 
terrorist movement” a forum and a community.171 Beyond the community, these shooters 
seek notoriety and build on each other’s actions. Each shooter seems to want to outdo the 
last. Christopher Picciolini, a reformed white nationalist who now works to de-radicalize 
 
166District of Columbia 1100 Connecticut Ave NW Suite 1300B Washington and Dc 20036, 
“PolitiFact - In Context: Donald Trump’s ‘Very Fine People on Both Sides’ Remarks (Transcript),” 
@politifact, accessed May 10, 2020, https://www.politifact.com/article/2019/apr/26/context-
trumps-very-fine-people-both-sides-remarks/. 
167Charles Murray, Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010 (Crown Forum, 2012). 
168J.D. Vance, Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and a Culture in Crisis (Harper, 2016). 
169Yara Bayoumy and Kathy Gilsinan, “A Reformed White Nationalist Says the Worst Is Yet to 
Come,” The Atlantic, August 6, 2019, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/conversation-christian-picciolini/595543/. 
170Arango, “Minutes Before El Paso Killing, Hate-Filled Manifesto Appears Online.” 
171 Bayoumy and Gilsinan, “A Reformed White Nationalist Says the Worst Is Yet to Come.”  
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extremists, explains that not only are they trying to outdo each other, but they are also 
trying to outdo Timothy McVeigh.172 The Sandy Hook shooter had studied the 
Columbine massacre and many others. The shooter who killed 50 at the Pulse Nightclub 
in Orlando, Florida had studied a previous attack in San Bernardino, California – both 
shooters cited radical Islam as a justification. Psychologists argue that mass shooters 
often see themselves as a part of a brotherhood of resentful and isolated young men and 
previous terrorists are often idols.173 The Columbine massacre, especially, acts as a 
blueprint for mass shooters.174 It created an entire subculture of violent people infatuated 
with Columbine and shooters using it as a blueprint for their mass murder plans.175 
 The other collective at play is civilians and their collective sense of security. Mass 
shootings are terrorism, and terrorism relies on theater as a way of inciting fear. 
Terrorism hopes to create political change by creating an atmosphere of fear rather than 
causing material damage. Terrorists have neither military ability nor power but hope to 
affect the balance of power. As impossible of a mission as it seems, it is often successful, 
especially in the mass shooting context. By affecting civilians’ sense of collective 
security, mass shootings erode American democracy. Terrorism targets public spaces. 
Mass shooters target malls, concerts, food festivals, bars, schools, and cinemas. By doing 
 
172 Bayoumy and Gilsinan, “A Reformed White Nationalist Says the Worst Is Yet to Come.” 
173 Benedict Carey, “What Experts Know About People Who Commit Mass Shootings,” The New 
York Times, August 5, 2019, sec. Health, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/health/mass-
shootings-mental-health.html. 
174Valerie Strauss, “Perspective | School Shootings Didn’t Start in 1999 at Columbine. Here’s 
Why That Disaster Became a Blueprint for Other Killers and Created the ‘Columbine 
Generation’’,’” Washington Post, April 2019, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/04/18/school-shootings-didnt-start-columbine-
heres-why-that-disaster-became-blueprint-other-killers-created-columbine-generation/. 
175Jenni Raitanen and Atte Oksanen, “Global Online Subculture Surrounding School Shootings,” 
American Behavioral Scientist, January 30, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764218755835. 
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this, they destroy civilians’ sense of safety in public spaces and communal gatherings. 
Fundamental common experiences such as eating, socializing, or learning become 
experiences of panic and death.176 When shootings take place at community events or 
within a neighborhood, they erode the sense of home. A democratic society does not 
function well with increased surveillance and security, and without spontaneous 
socialization and public gatherings.  
Current Narratives as They Contribute to Legacy Formation 
 Ensuring coverage of terrorism is a key part of the terrorist strategy because it 
allows them to broadcast terror far beyond their immediate victims. It is a mutually 
beneficial relationship; the media need drama and visuals and the terrorists need a 
platform. It is journalistically routine to name mass killers and often important in order to 
apprehend them. But once they are captured, many organizations argue that their 
identities should not be sensationalized. Since some attackers are motivated by a desire 
for notoriety, campaigns like “Don’t Name Them”177 and “No Notoriety”178 push media 
outlets to avoid naming terrorists. These strategies are endorsed by the FBI, who argue 
that mass shootings have a contagion effect.179 If the news cycle continues to immortalize 
mass shooters, the cycle of young isolated men idolizing them continues. By making sure 
these terrorists will not be famous, the media removes a powerful incentive. These 
campaigns also seek to focus coverage on victims and heroes. This makes sense as a 
 
176“Mass Shootings Are Destroying Our Sense of Public Space,” The Trace, August 4, 2019, 
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177 “The Reasons,” DontNameThem.org, accessed May 5, 2020, https://www.dontnamethem.org. 
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journalistic practice, but also from a historical lens. An important part of this thesis is the 
argument that historical memories should make sure victims of violence are not as 
marginalized historically as they were in their lifetimes. The current narratives 
surrounding mass shootings will create a legacy - the same way the coverage of the 
Columbine shooter created a legacy. Unlike the historical case studies in this thesis, mass 
shootings are an ongoing crisis. They are also motivated by historical myths and ideas 
that their identities are under threat, but rather than focusing on proper memorialization, 
we have an opportunity to change the course of the legacy of mass shootings to prevent 
current violence.  
 Racism, race-based islamophobia, and anti-immigrant sentiment is often a 
primary part of mass shooter’s manifestos. But while these are foundational factors, we 
cannot assume that they are the main motivators. Many Americans harbor similar 
thoughts, and yet only a minority resort to violence. The same logic applies with gun 
control. While gun control would undoubtedly limit violence, it would not end it. 
Terrorists committed to violence find a way to carry out violence. Mass shooters are a 
group of isolated and angry young men who have no outlet for their frustrations beyond 
violence. Many factors play a role in this, from ethnic hatred and racism to mental illness 
and from political elites’ rhetoric to popular polarization in the US, but many of these 
factors coalesce into a larger feeling of being at threat.  
Overlooked Themes 
 An important part of making sure that current narratives do not feed into future 
violence is making sure that these narratives do not overlook key factors. Out of the 171 
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mass shootings in the US since 1966, 3 have been conducted by women. Many of the 
men are described with similar language: isolated, troubled, angry.180 There is no 
significant analysis of gender in the discourse of mass shootings. Democrats obsess over 
gun control, and Republicans obsess over mental health – but no one seems to focus on 
the third glaring commonality in mass shooters. Even the Violence Project, that analyzes 
a database of 171 mass shooters and discovers four commonalities, ignores gender as a 
factor. The four commonalities are childhood trauma, a crisis point, a script and access.181 
While mass shooters clearly feel threatened in terms of political disenfranchisement, it is 
important to note that their masculinity is often also at threat. Eric Madfis coined the term 
“triple privilege” to describe how mass shooters often share elements of white 
entitlement, toxic heterosexual masculinity and anxieties about middle-class instability.182 
All three of these identities concern privilege, and fit well into the power/threat 
framework because they are not at threat in absolute terms but other groups are relatively 
gaining. Madfis also argues that societal pressures lead to women internalizing anger 
while men are taught to externalize it through acts of aggression.  
 Masculinity plays a key role in violence. This thesis overlooked questions of 
gender in specific cases of violence for the sake of brevity, but it is important to have a 
gendered understanding of violence. Women are often relegated to the sides during 
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studies of violence, or simply acknowledged as victims of sexual violence. But women 
cannot be pushed into the category of victims as men are acknowledged as fighters and 
politicians. Gender is also important to acknowledge because masculinity is often a 
crucial motivator of violence. Militarization often relies on men believing that they are 
defending their manhood.183 Their masculinity becomes dependent on their performance 
as soldiers. Curiosity is an important part of this scholarship – soldiering and military 
activity is often discussed as a naturally manly activity, but, in fact, it takes significant 
mental energy to engage in the activity of constructing it as masculine. These persuasive 
strategies are explicit and often backed by coercion. In most wars, the government 
embarks on an intentional strategy to create gender roles. Huge marketing budgets are 
allocated to create a narrative of shaming men who do not want to be soldiers, and 
convincing women it is their maternal duty to support the men from home. Sexual 
violence often gets constructed as inevitable when it is also often a very intentional 
strategy by which to bring masculinity into play for militiamen.  
 Christopher Browning examines the role of comradeship and group dynamics in 
violence and how group pressures led men to kill defenseless Jewish people.184 These ties 
of comradeship were heavily masculinized. The concern was that their fellow men would 
stop thinking that they were ‘tough.’ Nationalist propaganda was not enough to transform 
these men into killers, and neither was a culture of masculinity alone. It was an intensely 
purposeful strategy of building relationships infused with ideas of masculinity and tying 
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these men’s ability to kill to the respect of their peers. Lee Ann Fuji examines how group 
ties convinced more Hutu to join killing bands on a local level because it was more 
difficult to defy the group than follow along. A lot of this was likely influenced by ethnic 
ties, and concerns over betraying their fellow Hutu, but how much of it became a 
question of toughness and masculinity?185 During anti-Jewish pogroms, Nazis were often 
convinced to stop pogroms by Jewish women who gave them “soap and coffee” and then 
were “put to work.”186 In the Punjab massacres at the time of the Partition, tales of Hindu 
women being violated by Muslim men were a powerful motivator in pushing Hindu men 
to violence.187 For Hindu men, their role was masculinized as they were cast as protectors 
of their religion while Hindu women were simultaneously not only cast as victims, but 
the weak link. 
 Gender thus plays a significant role in questions of ethnic nationalism. 
Nationalism allows women to find a place in the public sphere, but nationalism also casts 
them as symbols of a violated nation. Clear from the example of Hindu women, ethnic 
nationalism often casts women as patriarchally constructed symbols. Women are rarely 
real participants of nationalist movements, partly because nationalism is a movement 
based on the idea of belonging, which automatically creates an insider/outsider dynamic. 
Nationalist movements are also typically conceived from masculinized memory.188 
Women are rarely looked on to understand the history of a colonized people, even though 
they experience multi-layered oppression. 
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 Theology plays an important role in issues of collective violence as well. 
Violence, especially terrorist violence, requires a great deal of internal conviction and 
some legitimization from a respected authority. Often, this authority comes from political 
elites. But sometimes individuals look to God and theology for justifications for their 
violence. All religions have been used to justify violence in some ways and individuals 
are able to find theological justifications for their causes. In the case of Timothy 
McVeigh, he sought revenge against what he thought to be a tyrannical government. 
McVeigh saw around himself a world at war, and believed Christians have a moral duty 
to reassert the dominion of God over all things. This is another way in which religious 
terrorism is collective violence rather than an individual acting on their own. McVeigh 
saw himself as a soldier in a holy cosmic war.189 He was simply making one move in a 
larger Christian war against a secular and tyrannical state. Islamic theological 
justifications operate along similar lines. It is a question of a cosmic fight against 
apostasy – and so one must use any means necessary.190 With theological justifications, 
the argument depends on the idea that the religion or group is under threat. With Islamic 
justifications, the threat is often Western cultural imperialism. Like Timothy McVeigh 
and many mass shooters, some terrorists with Islamic theological justifications employ an 
ideology of “America as enemy.”191 More than any other country, the US is often 
villainized as a foe. For domestic terrorists, this often means they target symbols of 
American culture or society – a culture and society they perceive to have manipulated the 
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history of their region. Terrorists from abroad often see the US’s economic and political 
reach as an agent of colonialism, and so see their violence as a mechanism of self-
defense. 
Discussions of theology as it relates to collective violence also require a gendered 
lens. Movements that resort to religious terrorism tend to empower marginal men to carry 
out violence. The men are typically part of socially/economically unstable groups that 
need a sense of purpose. Men, more so than women, gain a sense of purpose and identity 
through their public personas and so fears of impending marginality generate more 
anxity. Right wing religious movements often also rely on a crisis of sexuality to 
motivate young men. Women’s liberty is seen as a threat to honor, a question of “sex out 
of place,” and a loss of control.192 
 
Future Study 
 This thesis aimed to understand why civilians would take up arms against their 
friends and neighbors, and why violence of this nature seems to constantly repeat itself. It 
came from questions surrounding the ethics of remembrance and memorialization. It is 
not a complete analysis of the complex and nuanced motivators at play in moments of 
crisis and statelessness. Ideally, this analysis would include more theory on nationalism 
and colonialism and analyze theoretical frameworks of collective violence alongside 
questions of nationalism and colonialism, with a feminist lens. Further study on this topic 
would not only require a broader lens in terms of theory, but also a narrower lens for the 
case studies.  
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 Ethnic violence and racial violence follow very different scripts, and to fully 
understand one, it needs to be explored in depth without the other. Furthermore, each 
case study would need a far more in depth analysis of geographic and spatial factors. 
Each case study mentioned in this chapter spans a geographic landscape, and three of 
them are moments of collective violence made up of many individual outbreaks of 
violence. The spatial dynamics at play in the urban landscape of Tulsa are different than 
the spatial dynamics of rural Rwanda. Perhaps the urban landscape motivated people 
towards vandalism and away from murder, whereas the rural Rwandan landscape did the 
opposite. There are also many questions that can only be answered by examining the 
minutiae of specific massacres. The Lviv pogrom was different than the Boryslav one, 
the Calcutta killings different from the Noakhali massacres. 
 In many ways, this thesis tries to step away from a bird’s eye view of violence to 
better understand the dynamics at play. In some ways, it falls into a similar trap. Without 
examining specific and localized causes for violence and local politics as they affected 
group dynamics, it is not possible to fully explain how civilians were motivated towards 
violence. But in many other ways, it succeeds in its aim with its scope. Historical writing 
that presupposes events as inevitabilities misses how processes are intentionally 
constructed to marginalize and victimize certain people. Questions of inevitability often 
amount to lazy storytelling, allowing global systems like patriarchy or colonialism to 
become fixed, rather than acknowledging that they continuously evolve and modernize to 
adapt to oppress the same groups. Our remembrance affects whether these groups will 
continue to be marginalized, or not.  
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“What is a child? 
A quiet between two bombardments.” 
“Deaf Republic” by Ilya Kaminsky 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“History is not the same thing as memory. Memory is the way we put history to rest, 
especially histories of suffering, trauma and victimization.” 
Achilles Joseph Mbembe 
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